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SILENCE
Marcy Strauss*
Silence is Golden; Closed Lips hurt no one, speaking may;
Speech is of time, silence is of eternity; For words divide
and rend, but silence is most noble till the end; And silence
like poultice comes to heal the blows of sound; Be silent
and safe, silence never betrays you. I
I. INTRODUCTION
John Smith is arrested for murder. At his trial, Smith takes the
stand and admits that he killed the victim, but asserts for the first
time that it was in self-defense. During cross-examination, the
prosecutor asks the following questions in an attempt to discredit
Smith's testimony:
Q: And did you immediately go to the police and tell them
that you had been attacked and acted solely in self-defense?
A: No, I didn't.
Q: In fact, after you were arrested five days later, did you
tell the police this story you're telling now-that you acted
in self-defense?
A: No.
2
In closing argument, the prosecutor relies heavily on Smith's
failure to assert that he acted in self-defense prior to his testimony at
trial in an attempt to impeach the credibility of the defendant. In
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D., 1981 Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center; B.S., 1987, Northwestern University. I wish to thank Erwin
Chemerinsky for always being so generous with his time by reading and cri-
tiquing this manuscript. I am also grateful for the work of my research assis-
tants: William Pao, Parhmal Rahmit, Leeza Gelfer, and especially Cori
Ferraro.
1. Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 907 (Pa. 1967) (quoting
Swiss inscription from Sartor Resartus, bk. iii, chap. iii).
2. Adapted from Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,233-34 (1980).
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essence, the government's argument is that Smith's silence-his fail-
ure to provide exculpatory evidence prior to trial-demonstrates the
falsity of his defense and impeaches his credibility. Thus, the
government asserts that admission of such evidence fosters the truth-
seeking function of the trial.
On the other hand, Smith's silence prior to trial may be explain-
able for any number of reasons separate from the truth or falsity of
the self-defense rationale. He may have been frightened, shocked, or
fearful after the attack, and when dealing with the police. Addition-
ally, and more importantly, Smith was under no duty to provide ex-
planations to the police, or to come forward with his defense. To the
contrary, he may have a constitutional right to remain silent under
the Fifth Amendment. If so, does using Smith's silence to impeach
his testimony violate either the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination, or the Due Process guarantee of fundamental fair-
ness? Does the answer depend on whether or not Smith was arrested
when his "silence" occurred? Moreover, does it matter whether
Smith had been given his Miranda warnings and had therefore been
told explicitly about his right to remain silent?
3
This Article attempts to provide answers to these questions by
exploring the issue of when a defendant's silence may be used
against him4 in a criminal trial either for impeachment purposes or to
establish the elements of the crime.5 Such a question is especially
3. For a discussion of the Miranda warnings and the genesis of the rule see
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), upholding Miranda warnings
as constitutionally required; Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda,
54 U. Cm. L. REV. 435 (1987); and also Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).
4. Defendants will be referred to throughout this Article as "he" or "him."
In the hundreds of cases I read in preparing this Article, all but a handful of the
defendants were male. Thus, for simplicity's sake, the male pronoun will be
used throughout the Article.
5. Impeachment is used to attack the veracity of a witness, most typically
by showing a prior inconsistent statement. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 5.10 (Supp. 2001). The theory of im-
peachment through prior inconsistent statements is not that the substance of the
trial testimony is untrue, but rather that the contradiction between the statement
made previously and the statement given at trial casts doubt on the credibility
of the witness. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 616 (1976); Note, Protecting
Doyle Rights After Anderson v. Charles: The Problem of Partial Silence, 69
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salient today for several reasons. First, there is significant disagree-
ment among the appellate courts, particularly with respect to the use
of prearrest, pre-Miranda silence introduced to prove the govern-
ment's case-in-chief.6 And even in the one area which appears set-
tled-the admissibility of postarrest, post-Miranda silence-there is
distinct rumbling for change, including at the highest level. Al-
though the Supreme Court held almost twenty-five years ago that the
Due Process Clause precludes the introduction of an arrested sus-
pect's silence after he has been given Miranda warnings, the Su-
preme Court has recently indicated a desire to reconsider that hold-
ing.7
Thus, this Article attempts a comprehensive examination of the
various rules involved in the evidentiary use of a defendant's silence.
Moreover, it explores the purposes for introducing the evidence-
whether to impeach or establish substantive evidence of guilt. The
Due Process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination will also be ana-
lyzed. Additionally, this Article considers the admissibility of pre-
trial silence under state constitutional and evidence law.
Besides describing the current state of the law, this Article will
also attempt to address the key normative questions: What should be
the rule governing the use of silence in a criminal trial? What rule
maximizes the goals of truth seeking while maintaining fidelity to the
relevant constitutional and evidentiary rules?
Part II catalogues the courts' approaches to the admissibility of
silence and will explain the rules at the federal and state level gov-
erning the use of silence in three settings: (1) postarrest and post-
Miranda; (2) postarrest but pre-Miranda; and (3) prearrest and pre-
Miranda. Part III argues that viewed as a whole, the current rules do
VA. L. REV. 155, 155 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter Protecting Doyle Rights].
Alternatively, silence may be introduced in the case-in-chief, as evi-
dence of guilt. For example, the government might try to argue that an inno-
cent man would protest his arrest, or would exclaim his innocence.
6. The appellate courts are now divided 4-3 against admissibility.
7. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74 (2000) ("Although there might
be reason to reconsider Doyle, we need not do so here."). Moreover, in the
course of the decision, the Court seemed to undercut the central premise of
Doyle: "It is possible to believe that [the Miranda warnings] contained an im-
plicit promise that his choice of the option of silence would not be used against
him." Id. at 75 (first emphasis added).
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not make sense. Arguing that consistency is important, this Article
suggests a cohesive, consistent set of rules governing this area. The
central conclusion is that the courts-including the Supreme Court-
have taken the wrong Due Process approach, and that a better one is
to emphasize the inherent ambiguity in the meaning of silence. Ad-
ditionally, the Fifth Amendment should be read broader than most
courts read it now in order to preclude the introduction of pretrial si-
lence.
But first, a word about "silence." There is surprisingly little dis-
cussion in the case law and commentary about what precisely consti-
tutes a comment about the defendant's silence. 8 On the one hand, it
is clear that if the defendant stands mute at all times, and the prose-
cutor later questions the police officer: "Did the suspect say any-
thing?" it evokes comment on the suspect's silence. 9 Moreover, in
8. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 n.13 (1986); United
States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1569 (1 1th Cir. 1991) ("Although both logic
and common sense dictate that 'silence' is more than mere muteness, there is
no definite outer boundary in determining what types of nonverbal conduct or
demeanor, whether assertive or nonassertive, a prosecutor may permissibly
comment on without running afoul of the dictates of Miranda."). Even in
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the seminal Supreme Court case on the
use of postarrest, post-Miranda silence, the meaning of silence is somewhat
obscure. The Court analyzed the issue as though both defendants had re-
mained mute, describing the case as one involving cross-examination of a per-
son "who remain[s] silent" after police informed him of his Miranda warnings.
Id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While one defendant said nothing, the other
asked the arresting officers, "[W]hat's this all about?" When told the reason
for the arrest, he responded, "[Y]ou got to be crazy." Id. at 623 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1980) (quot-
ing the dialogue between the defendants and the prosecutor during cross-
examination); Protecting Doyle Rights, supra note 5, at 159 n.33 (stating that
Doyle's initial response was disbelief, but he said nothing about any other is-
sue that later emerged in trial).
9. Even if the meaning of silence could be determined, moreover, there is
an additional question about what constitutes an impermissible use of that si-
lence. Several courts have held that merely mentioning silence inadvertently
in the course of a narrative (i.e., describing the arrest process) does not pose
any constitutional problems. See, e.g., Haberek v. Maloney, 81 F. Supp. 2d
202, 208-10 (D. Mass. 2000) (stating that Due Process does not forbid all men-
tion of Miranda warnings and a defendant's response to them at trial); Putman
v. Turpin, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1303-04 (M.D. Ga. 1999); McFarland v. State,
989 S.W.2d 899, 907 (Ark. 1999) (stating that inadvertent mention of defen-
dant's invocation is not a constitutional violation); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d
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some circumstances, there is no doubt that words can be treated like
silence. For example, if, in response to police questioning, the de-
fendant says: "I want my lawyer," or "I wish to remain silent," the
government may not ask about, or comment upon, the defendant's
words.10 To elicit testimony in court that these words were spoken is
a comment on silence.
What if the government wants to inquire about nonverbal con-
duct or demeanor? For example, what if the prosecutor argues that
the suspects did not look surprised when large amounts of cocaine
were discovered in their belongings? Should this be viewed as con-
duct separate from silence, or a comment that the defendant is "act-
ing" silent and therefore potentially excludable? The courts have not
yet decided."
Finally, how should omission in the context of other statements
be treated? What if the defendant spoke to the police, and the prose-
cution wants to bring out the fact that he said x, but not y? For
262, 269 (Wash. 1998) (stating that inadvertent mention of defendant's invoca-
tion is not a constitutional violation); cf Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 216-
17 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the same question with respect to the use of as-
sertion of silence to establish sanity).
10. Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 n.13 ("[S]ilence does not mean only mute-
ness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire
to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted."); accord United States
ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987); State v. Woods, 542
N.W.2d 410 (Neb. 1996) (illustrating that the right to refuse to give a taped
statement is treated as silence); see also Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 278-86
(6th Cir. 2000) (stating the same rationale as Wainwright); cf Hill v. Turpin,
135 F.3d 1411, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that silence includes a post-
Miranda invocation of the right to counsel); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562,
1562 (1st Cir. 1989) ("And if you think I'm going to confess to you, you're
crazy" was treated as invoking Fifth Amendment right and comment upon it
was treated like a comment on the right to remain silent).
11. See Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1569; United States v. Wright, 47 M.J. 555, 558
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that the fact that the defendant did not
look surprised does not raise Fiftfi Amendment concerns because it is nontes-
timonial). But see United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 538 (1st Cir. 1985)
(indicating that the government cannot comment on the defendant's lack of
surprise at the time of arrest). Cf Kappos v. Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 369 (7th Cir.
1995) (arguing that defendant's refusal to answer questions and his exit from
police station were "actions," not silence). The Seventh Circuit noted that such
a distinction did not make sense: "A voiced refusal to cooperate or acts indi-
cating such a refusal are the equivalent of invoking the right of silence, and
prosecutors may not comment on them in the circumstances present here." Id.
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example, imagine a suspect told the police that the person he shot
had been coming on to his daughter. At trial, the suspect gave a dif-
ferent explanation: He testified that he shot the person because he
was afraid; the person had a reputation for violence and was associ-
ated with the Mafia. Can the prosecutor at trial, after eliciting what
the suspect actually told the police, then ask: "And did he say any-
thing else?" Or is a question concerning what was not said a ques-
tion on silence, no different than simply asking if the defendant said
anything about the crime?'
2
There is some disagreement about the scope of silence when the
suspect does talk, albeit incompletely to the police. The Supreme
Court considered this issue in a per curiam opinion in Anderson v.
Charles.13 There, the defendant, who was arrested in a stolen car and
charged with murdering the car's owner, told the police that he had
stolen the car from a particular location. 14 At trial, the defendant said
he had actually stolen the car from a different, exculpatory location.
15
Under cross-examination, the prosecutor asked why he had omitted
that information from his prior statement. 16  The defendant re-
sponded that he did not think it was important because he had been
arrested for murder, not auto theft, and that later his attorney told him
not to say anything.'
7
The Supreme Court held that this cross-examination, considered
as a whole, did not constitute an unfair use of silence, because the
prosecutor was simply attempting to obtain an explanation for a prior
inconsistent statement, and not trying to draw meaning from the si-
lence. 18 The Supreme Court concluded: "Each of two inconsistent
12. These facts are adapted from State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1990).
The facts there were a bit more sordid, because the daughter (stepdaughter ac-
tually) was now the live-in lover of the man charged with the shooting. See id.
at 308.
13. 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam).
14. See id. at 405-06.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 406.
18. See id. at 409; accord Rowan v. Owens, 752 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir.
1984); United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 505 (1st Cir. 1977). See gen-
erally David J. Skalka, Note, Defining Silence Under Doyle v. Ohio, Has the
Nebraska Supreme Court Become an Impregnable Citadel of Technicality?,
State v. Woods, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 171 (1996) (discussing the protection
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descriptions of events may be said to involve 'silence' insofar as it
omits facts included in the other version. But [our precedents do] not
require any such formalistic understanding of 'silence,' and we find
no reason to adopt such a view in this case."
19
So then what is silence? What seems on face value to be a sim-
ple question in reality is a more complicated proposition. If a sus-
pect fails to make any statement, or fails to come forward to explain
himself, the suspect surely is staying "silent." Beyond the situation
where a suspect stays mute, or asserts his right to remain silent, the
question must be addressed contextually, taking into account the
likely purpose of the question, and the likely reaction of the jury.
The ultimate consideration must be whether the government is at-
tempting to call attention to a prior inconsistent statement, or instead,
whether the question or comment is designed to suggest an inference
of guilt from the silence itself.20 Or, as some courts have asked, are
given to a defendant's silence under Doyle and the limits the court subse-
quently placed in its holding).
19. Anderson, 447 U.S. at 409; see also People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605,
610 n.7 (Colo. 1983) ("The failure to make any statement should be distin-
guished from the situation where an accused does make a statement.., but...
omits significant details which are later included in a subsequent
statement .... The omission of a significant detail ... is in the nature of a
prior inconsistent statement.").
20. See United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Scott; 47 F.3d 904, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramos,
932 F.2d 611, 616-17 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mora, 845 F.2d 233,
235-36 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Thomas v. State, 726 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam) (indicating that police testimony that defen-
dant had no response to one question in the middle of an interview was not im-
permissible comment on defendant's right to remain silent). But see People v.
Hurd, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1084, 1093-94, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203, 209 (1998),
where the court took a different position than the cases which have held that a
defendant who chooses to answer some questions can still claim a constitu-
tional violation when government refers to his "partial" silence. The court held
that "[a] defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once a defendant
elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her refusal to answer
questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that
such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights." Id. at 1093, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 209. In this case, the defendant, who was accused of shooting his wife,
talked freely about his relationship with his wife, and explained how the shoot-
ing occurred with a diagram, but refused to demonstrate the shooting. See id.
The court concluded, "[h]aving talked, what he said or omitted must be judged
on its merits or demerits...." Id. at 1094, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209. It should
be noted, however, that the suspect was repeatedly warned by officers that his
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the prosecutor's comments or questions "fairly susceptible of being
interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence." 21 In-
troducing evidence of "formalistic silence"--the implicit silent
statement that "not x" is false which accompanies every statement
that "x is true"-should not be considered as the use of silence.
22
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SILENCE:
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT LAW
As previously alluded to, the rules concerning the use of the de-
fendant's silence turn on when that silence occurred. The Supreme
Court holds that silence that takes place after issuing Miranda warn-
ings is inadmissible for any purpose-impeachment or substantive
evidence of guilt. Silence that occurs in the absence of Miranda
warnings, however, is constitutionally admissible for impeachment
purposes, subject to exclusion by the court under the rules of evi-
dence. Whether silence before Miranda warnings have been issued
can be used in the case-in-chief has not been addressed by the Su-
preme Court, and the lower courts have reached conflicting results.
A. Postarrest, Post-Miranda Silence: Doyle v. Ohio
23
1. Impeachment
Can the government impeach a suspect for failing to say some-
thing when that silence occurred after the police arrested the suspect
and informed the suspect of a right to remain silent? In Doyle v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court considered this precise question.24 There,
two suspects-Doyle and Wood-were arrested and charged with
selling ten pounds of marijuana to Bonnell, an informant.25 They
were arrested shortly after the sale took place, and given Miranda
refusal to show how the shooting occurred would be used against him. See id.
at 1094 n.4, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209 n.4.
21. Smith, 573 So. 2d at 317.
22. See Anderson, 447 U.S. at 409; Protecting Doyle Rights, supra note 5,
at 171.
23. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). To understand the decisions regarding silence
during the other stages, the analysis needs to start with postarrest because the
reasoning in the other areas draws on the Supreme Court analysis in Doyle.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 611.
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warnings.26 Although the police did not witness the sale, the police
searched the car and uncovered the money that the informant pre-
sumably used to make a purchase.
27
At trial, the defendants took the stand and admitted to every-
thing but the ultimate fact: that they sold the marijuana. Rather, the
defendants argued that the informant was trying to frame them and
that it was the informant who was selling the marijuana to them.28
Doyle testified that Bonnell grew angry when Doyle changed his
mind about the purchase and claimed that Bonnell then threw the
money in his car. Confused about why Bonnell would give them
money when the drug sale was aborted, the defendants argued that
they were trying to catch up with Bonnell to ask him about the
money when the police pulled them over.
29
As the Supreme Court noted, this explanation by the defendants
"presented some difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely
implausible and there was little if any direct evidence to contradict
it."30  Thus, the prosecutor attempted to undercut the explanation
through cross-examination, particularly questioning why the defen-
dants had not told the frame-up story to the police officer who first
arrested them.31 For example, the prosecutor queried: "Mr. Wood, if
... you are innocent, when [the police officer) arrived on the scene
why didn't you tell him [you were set up]?"' 3 - Objections to these
questions were overruled, and both Doyle and Woods were con-
victed.33
The Supreme Court held that impeachment use of the defen-
dant's postarrest silence violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.3 a The court emphasized two reasons why Due
26. See id. at 612.
27. Seeid. at 611-12.
28. The informant, like so many, had an extensive criminal past, and thus
this was not out of the realm of possibilities. Moreover, none of the four nar-
cotic agents involved in the arrest could see who had passed the marijuana to
whom. See id. at 611-12 n.2.
29. See id. at 613.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 613-14.
32. Id. at 614.
33. See id.
34. The Supreme Court only considered the Due Process Clause violation
and did not reach the question of whether the Fifth Amendment right against
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Process was infringed. First, postarrest, post-Miranda silence is in-
herently ambiguous: "Silence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings
may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda
rights. Thus, every postarrest silence is insolubly ambiguous be-
cause of what the State is required to advise the person arrested. 35
Second, the Supreme Court stressed that the warnings carry at
least an implicit assurance that silence will not be used against the
arrestee-that the exercise of the right to remain silent carries no
penalty. If impeachment were allowed based on silence, therefore,
the defendant would be penalized for relying on the assurances of the
govenmnent. "In such circumstances," the court opined, "it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of [D]ue [P]rocess to allow
the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial. 36 Thus, even though recognizing the
importance of cross-examination, and the possibility that the truth-
seeking function might be frustrated, the Supreme Court held that the
impeachment use of the defendant's silence at the time of arrest and
after receiving Miranda warnings was unconstitutional.37
self-incrimination was infringed, despite the fact that the briefs of the parties
addressed the right against self-incrimination. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 616 n.6;
Brief for Petitioners at 26, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (No. 75-5014).
Justice Stevens in his dissent did consider the Fifth Amendment arguments
even though the majority did not, and found they were wanting. See Doyle,
426 U.S. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due
Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in Criminal Trials, 29
WM. & MARY L. REv. 285, 302 nn.104-05 (discussing the rationale in Doyle
that using defendant's silence for impeachment purposes constitutes an imper-
missible penalty on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination).
35. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
36. Id. at 618. As Justice White noted in an earlier concurrence, anyone
would reasonably conclude from the Miranda warnings that the silence would
not be used against him. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-83
(1975); see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 75 (2000) ("It is possible to
believe that [the Miranda warnings] contained an implicit promise that his
choice of the option of silence would not be used against him."); cf Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197 (1943) (arguing that it is unfair to allow
comments on privilege when the judge had told the defendant he could rely on
it). The point was not that everyone who chose to remain silent actually relied
on the warnings, but that it is unfair to foster reliance.
37. The Supreme Court remanded the case, noting that the state had not
claimed that the use of such evidence was harmless error. See Doyle, 426 U.S.
at 619-20; see, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (argu-
ing that the Doyle error fits within a category of constitutional violations which
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There is one exception, however, to this blanket prohibition on
use: if the defendant himself puts silence into question, either by
raising the issue first,38 or by testimony that stands in direct contra-
diction to silence.39 For example, if the suspect testified that he told
the police about his exculpatory information,40 or that he fully coop-
erated with the police,41 evidence of postarrest, post-Miranda silence
is admissible to contradict those assertions. As noted in Doyle, "[i]t
goes almost without saying" that in these situations, the "fact of ear-
lier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but
rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior fol-
lowing arrest."42
are called "trial error," and thus must be shown to be harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt); see also United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437-40 (3d Cir.
1996) (noting that the prosecution's impeachment use of defendant's post-
Miranda silence could not be distinguished from that in Doyle and would thus
be unconstitutional). Thus, a Doyle violation will not be grounds for reversal if
the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, United States v. Dunbar,
767 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1985), or if the reference to silence is insignificant.
See Lane v. State, 708 So. 2d 206, 209-10 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); see also
United States v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Doyle violations
often result in reversal, premised as they are on the constitutional right to si-
lence."). See generally J. Thomas Sullivan, The "Burden " of Proof in Federal
Habeas Litigation, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 205 (1995) (discussing shifts in the
federal habeas petitioner's burden of demonstrating a right to relief in federal
claims raised by state inmates in federal habeas proceedings).
38. See State v. Wilcox, No. 03C01-9808-CR-00314, 1999 WL 894861, at
*14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (indicating that the defendant testified that he in-
voked the right to remain silent and denied that he made statements to police);
State v. Sadowski, 805 P.2d 537, 546 (Mont. 1991) (stating that Doyle does not
apply when the defendant raises the issue of silence as proof of his innocence).
39. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619-20 n.1 1.
40. See Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1996) (indicating
that at trial, when the defendant testified that he told everyone he was innocent,
testimony that he remained silent, or did not proclaim innocence, was admissi-
ble).
41. See United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating
that post-Miranda silence is admissible to rebut the defendant's claim that he
stood ready to cooperate at all times); People v. Vanover, 505 N.W.2d 21, 23-
24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
42. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619-20 n.ll; see State v. Strouse, 992 P.2d 158, 163
(Idaho 1999) (holding that the Doyle exception did not apply); cf People v. Al-
len, 505 N.W.2d 869, 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Doyle exception applies
when the defendant testified that it was his first opportunity to tell his version
of the events).
An analogous exception exists to the rule established in Griffin v. Cali-
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2. Case-in-chief
If a statement cannot be used for impeachment purposes under
Doyle, is such evidence admissible in the case-in-chief? The intui-
tive answer would be no, and indeed both state and federal courts
have excluded evidence of postarrest, post-Miranda silence under
Doyle when used to show substantive evidence of guilt.
43
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which barred the government from commenting
on or otherwise using the defendant's failure to take the stand and testify at a
criminal trial. A prosecutor is not prevented from referring to the defendant's
silence at trial when the defense counsel argues that the defendant has not been
allowed by the government to give his side of the story. See United States v.
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1988). The Supreme Court recognized that
there may be some cost when the defendant chooses to remain silent in this
situation, but it declined to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the
prosecutor in such circumstances. See id.
43. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even the three dis-
senters in Doyle would not allow silence to be admissible in the case-in-chief.
See id. at 633-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d
465, 472 (5th Cir. 1999) (using postarrest, post-Miranda silence in the case-in-
chief is a constitutional violation); United States v. Tenoreo, 69 F.3d 1103,
1106-07 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that after Miranda warnings have been
given, the government cannot fairly use a defendant's silence against him at
trial as evidence of guilt); see also Freeman v. Class, 95 F.3d 639, 644 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that when a prosecutor, on his own initiative, asks the jury
to draw a negative inference from the defendant's silence, the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is violated); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123,
1134-35 (10th Cir. 1996) (disallowing the use of post-Miranda silence in the
case-in-chief, even if it is a prior inconsistent statement); United States v. Gant,
17 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that once a defendant receives
Miranda warnings, the use of postarrest silence to impeach an exculpatory
story given at trial is fundamentally unfair and violates Due Process); United
States v. Szymaniak, 934 F.2d 434, 439 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It follows [from
Doyle] that statements of a suspect's intent to remain silent are inadmissible in
the government's case-in-chief."); Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435-
36 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (holding that an officer's testimony, regarding postarrest
and post-Miranda silence, was not harmless error where it was emphasized by
the prosecutor as evidence of sanity); United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122,
1132 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the prosecutor's reference in closing argu-
ment that silence is inconsistent with innocence is reversible error); Alo v.
Olim, 639 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the use of a defendant's
post-Miranda silence during an arrest for impeachment purposes violates the
Due Process Clause); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284 (D.V.I. 1995)
(holding that the government's use of evidence that the defendant refused to
make a monitored telephone call to the codefendant did not violate the defen-
dant's right against self-incrimination or Due Process); Franklin v. Duncan,
884 F. Supp. 1435, 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("It is a fundamental principle of
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Such a principle was embraced by the Supreme Court in Wain-
wright v. Greenfield.44 There, Greenfield was arrested for sexual
battery two hours after the assault took place.4 5 After being given
Miranda warnings, Greenfield stated that he understood those rights,
and wanted to talk to an attorney before making a statement.46 Over
the next few hours, several others read him his Miranda rights, and
each time he repeated his request for an attorney.47  At trial,
Greenfield pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.48
In its case-in-chief, the prosecutor introduced the evidence of the
detectives, who testified about Greenfield's invocation of his right to
counsel.49 In closing argument the prosecutor suggested that
Greenfield's repeated refusal to answer questions and his numerous
requests for counsel were inconsistent with his claim of insanity.50
Greenfield was found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
51
After noting that this case, unlike Doyle, involved the use of si-
lence as affirmative proof in the government's case-in-chief and not
[D]ue [P]rocess that the government cannot use, at trial, a defendant's post-
Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt."); State v. Jones, 648 So. 2d
472, 479 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the "reasoning in Doyle should ap-
ply with even stronger force" when silence is used in the case-in-chief); State
v. Evans, 633 P.2d 83 (Wash. 1985) (holding that the police officer's testi-
mony regarding the defendant's postarrest silence was inadmissible); State v.
Davis, 686 P.2d 1143 (Wash. App. 1984) (extending Doyle to prohibit both
impeachment and substantive use of postarrest silence after Miranda warn-
ings).
44. 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
45. See id. at 286.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 285.
49. See id. at 286. "Under Florida law, when a defendant pleads not guilty
by reason of insanity and when his evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt about his sanity, the State has the burden of proving sanity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Id.
50. See id. at 287.
51. See id. The prosecutor argued: "He goes to the car and the officer
reads him his Miranda rights. Does he say he doesn't understand them? Does
he say, 'what's going on?' No. He says 'I understand my rights. I do not
want to speak to you. I want to speak to an attorney.' Again an occasion of a
person who knows what's going on around his surroundings, and knows the
consequences of his act." Id. at 287 n.2.
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for impeachment, the Supreme Court then found that such a distinc-
tion is irrelevant. As the court concluded:
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally
unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not
be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by
using the silence to impeach his trial testimony. It is
equally unfair to breach that promise by using silence to
overcome a defendant's plea of insanity. In both situations,
the State gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and
implicitly promises that any exercise of those rights will not
be penalized. In both situations, the State then seeks to
make use of the defendant's exercise of those rights in ob-
taining his conviction. The implicit promise, the breach,
and the consequent penalty are identical in both situations.
53
Thus, after Miranda warnings have been given, the government
cannot fairly use a defendant's silence in any way at trial. Use of si-
lence to impeach a defendant's testimony or as substantive evidence
of guilt in the government's case-in-chief is constitutionally imper-
missible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment once the suspect has been Mirandized.54
B. Postarrest, Pre-Miranda Silence
The Supreme Court in Doyle was careful to limit its holding and
restrict its analysis to one situation only: the use of postarrest, post-
Miranda silence. Since 1976 the courts have grappled with the ap-
plication of the principles in Doyle to situations where Miranda
52. See id. at 292. The state argued in part that Doyle is distinguishable be-
cause the suspect's comprehension of his Miranda warnings as evidenced by
silence is far more probative of sanity than of the commission of an underlying
offense. Thus, Doyle's rationale that the evidence is insolubly ambiguous does
not apply here. The Supreme Court held that it "need not evaluate the proba-
tive value of respondent's silence to reject this argument" because the main ra-
tionale of Doyle rested on the inherent unfairness of the government using si-
lence after assuring that it would not, not the ambiguity of the evidence. See
id. at 293-94.
53. Id. at 292.
54. See id. A similar rule is codified in the military rules of evidence. See
MIL. R. EVJD. 301(f)(3) ("[I]f an accused exercised... his constitutional right
to remain silent ... that fact may not be used as evidence against the ac-
cused.").
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warnings have not been given or where the defendant has not even
been arrested. What happens if the suspect is arrested, but not yet
read his Miranda warnings? Does Doyle apply? Various courts have
considered the use of silence in these circumstances both for im-
peachment purposes and for use in the case-in-chief. The bottom
line: The use of silence to impeach does not violate the U.S. Consti-
tution but may violate state constitutional and evidentiary princi-
ples,55 while the use of silence in the government's case-in-chief is
still in dispute.
1. Impeachment
a. federal constitutional limitations
In Fletcher v. Weir,56 the Supreme Court, in a short per curiam
opinion, considered the application of Doyle when the suspect was
arrested but it appeared that no Miranda warnings were given by the
arresting officer prior to the silence. In Fletcher, Weir stabbed the
victim during a fight and then left the scene without reporting the in-
cident to the police.57 At his trial for intentional murder, Weir admit-
ted the stabbing, but claimed that it was an accident and that he acted
in self-defense.58 When Weir took the stand, the prosecutor asked
why he had not offered the exculpatory explanation to the arresting
officer. Weir responded, "I didn't feel I ought to tell them any-
thing." 59 Weir was ultimately convicted of first degree manslaugh-
ter.
60
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on Doyle in
finding that the use of the postarrest silence violated the Due Process
55. Evidentiary issues are not explicitly considered in this section.
However numerous state cases' evidentiary decisions are referenced in Part III.
56. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
57. Id. See generally David E. Melson, Fourteenth Amendment--Criminal
Procedure: The Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest Silence Which Precedes the
Receipt of Miranda Warnings, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1572 (1982)
(arguing that the benefits of impeachment should be balanced against individ-
ual rights concerns).
58. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 603.
59. See Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. See id. at 1127.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 61  The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the Sixth Circuit gave an "overly broad reading
to our decision in Doyle v. Ohio."62 In essence, the Supreme Court
distilled Doyle to only one principle: The government may not in-
duce silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence
would not be used against him, and then breaking such a promise.
63
Any concern about the unfairness of using silence because of its in-
herent ambiguity was delegated to the realm of evidence law, not
constitutional doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded:
In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embod-
ied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it vio-
lates due process of law for a State to permit cross-
examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant
chooses to take the stand. A State is entitled, in such situa-
tions, to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of
evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest si-
lence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant's
own testimony.
64
b. state constitutional limits on postarrest, pre-Miranda silence:
a critique ofFletcher
In Fletcher the Supreme Court provided very little analysis as to
why reading Miranda warnings is the dispositive factor in determin-
ing fundamental fairness. Also, the court failed to consider possible
61. See id. at 1131.
62. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 604.
63. See id. at 605-06; see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 294
(1986) ("For the ambiguity of the defendants' silence in Doyle merely added
weight to the Supreme Court's principle rationale, which rested on the implied
assurance contained in the Miranda warning."); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S.
404, 407-08 (1980) ("Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain
silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used
against him. Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence main-
tained after receipt of governmental assurances.") (citations omitted); Splunge
v. Parke, 160 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Although Doyle and its precursor
[Hale] suggest that the problem with any reference to silence is its 'insoluble
ambiguity,' the Supreme Court jettisoned this justification in [Fletcher].") (ci-
tations omitted); cf Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628 (1993) (quoting
the principle in Doyle that it is unfair to use a statement after reliance).
64. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
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self-incrimination problems with permitting the admission of such
evidence. Not surprisingly, several state courts have interpreted their
own constitutional provisions to preclude the introduction of postar-
rest, pre-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.
65
In rejecting the Supreme Court's conclusion in Fletcher, these
state courts relied on several arguments. First, they disagreed with
the premise in Doyle and Fletcher that the actual giving of Miranda
warnings is determinative.66 According to these state courts, the
same right is being asserted by the defendant whether or not Miranda
warnings are provided, i.e., the right to remain silent. The reading of
warnings does not add or subtract from an individual's right against
65. See Nelson v. State, 691 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (con-
cluding that under Art. 1, § 9 of the Alaska Constitution, a person under arrest
cannot normally be impeached by the fact that he was silent following his ar-
rest); Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that a
state can place greater restrictions than federal courts can on the use of postar-
rest silence under the Federal Constitution); Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575,
579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (reading Texas Constitution to prohibit postarrest,
pre-Miranda silence and finding that the right to remain silent arises at the
moment of arrest); see also State v. Maness, 1990 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 65
(stating that a postarrest, pre-Miranda statement is not admissible under the
state constitution); State v. Davis, 686 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Wash. Ct..App. 1984)
(holding that the trial court's consideration of a juvenile's postarrest silence
violated the state due process guaranty). Some states, however, are not al-
lowed, or choose not, to read their constitutional protections broader than the
federal interpretation. See People v. Givens, 482 N.E.2d 211, 221 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (stating that Illinois consistently follows the U.S. Supreme Court);
State v. Hunt, 323 S.E.2d 490, 492 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) ("We are not aware of
any decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that would place more or
heavier burdens on the State's right to cross examine a testifying defendant
than those imposed by the Supreme Court of the United States."). California
state courts have held that postarrest, pre-Miranda silence is not admissible.
See People v. Fondron, 157 Cal. App. 3d 390, 395, 204 Cal. Rptr. 457, 461
(1984). However, in 1982, Proposition 8 was adopted, declaring that the ex-
clusionary rule applies only to matters for which federal law prohibits admis-
sion. See People v. O'Sullivan, 217 Cal. App. 3d 237, 244-45, 265 Cal. Rptr.
784, 788 (1990).
66. See, e.g., State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 768-70 (Fla. 1998) (finding
that postarrest silence, even absent Miranda warnings, violates the state's pro-
tection against self-incrimination); cf Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390
(Wyo. 1995) (extending the right to remain silent even to prearrest: "Since the
right to remain silent is a self-executing right, an accused is presumed to be ex-
ercising the right by his silence, prearrest and pre-Miranda when questioned by
the state's agents for purposes of a criminal investigation.").
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self-incrimination. These courts point out that distinguishing be-
tween circumstances when the rights are read or not makes little
sense because the rights embodied in Miranda are so well-known.
67
Indeed, in Fletcher itself, it can be presumed that Weir knew his
rights even though the police did not read them to him since he had
been arrested two times previously.
Thus, in either case-when rights are read, or when they are
not-the defendant presumptively may be relying on those rights in
maintaining his silence. As the Supreme Court of Nevada noted:
[T]he Miranda warnings and an arrestee's right to remain
silent have been widely publicized via the media, so that in
many cases, the silence of an unwarned arrestee will be
based on his personal knowledge of his Miranda rights;
therefore, the "implicit assurance" of Doyle that his silence
will not be used against him is inherently present.
68
The Court of Appeals of Washington agreed with this reasoning:
There is no logic in protecting a defendant advised of his
rights and not an unadvised defendant. Both defendants are
exercising the same constitutional right. The arrest itself is
governmental action which enshrouds a defendant with the
constitutional right to remain silent .... We hold that the
use of a defendant's postarrest silence, regardless of
whether such silence follows Miranda warnings, is
67. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 110 ("Miranda v. Arizona may be the
United States Supreme Court's best-known decision. Anyone who has
watched a television police drama during the last thirty years undoubtedly has
heard the famous warnings .... ."). Even as early as 1981, the Fifth Circuit
noted that "[t]hose warnings are well-established and mechanical in nature.
Most ten year old children who are permitted to stay up late enough to watch
police shows on television can probably recite them as well as any police offi-
cer." United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 330 n.1 1 (5th Cir. 1981); see
also Aaron R. Pettit, Should the Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on a De-
fendant's Pre-Arrest Silence in Its Case-in-Chie?, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L. J. 181,
217 (1997) ("Most Americans can recite the Miranda warnings by heart....").
68. Coleman v. State, 895 P.2d 653, 657 (Nev. 1995); cf Nelson, 691 P.2d
at 1059 (commenting on the prohibited use of postarrest silence); Lee, 422 So.
2d at 930 (affirming the prohibition against use of postarrest silence); Sanchez,
707 S.W.2d at 579 (affirming an implicit right to remain silent under the Texas
Constitution).
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fundamentally unfair and violates the due process clause of
the Washington Constitution, art. 1, § 3.69
Besides noting that the distinction between warned and un-
warned defendants is unprincipled, some state courts have eschewed
limiting the Doyle right only to post-Miranda situations out of fear
that such a rule might encourage the police to withhold the giving of
Miranda warnings. In other words, if the silence of an arrested, un-
warned suspect can be used for impeachment, police officers might
delay reading the Miranda warnings in the hope that the silence can
be used against the defendant.70 Eliminating the distinction between
postarrest, post-Miranda silence and postarrest, pre-Miranda silence,
foreclose[s] any inducement to police to engage in games-
manship--dispensing with a Miranda advisement where
they suspect that the arrestee would refuse to talk anyway,
or asking no questions immediately after the arrest in order
to use a defendant's silence against him, but later giving a
Miranda warning in order to secure a statement.
7 1
69. Davis, 686 P.2d at 1146; see also Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1056
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("[W]hile Miranda warnings make it even more of-
fensive to use a person's silence upon arrest against him, the absence of such
warnings does not add to nor detract from an individual's Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. If one has a right upon arrest not to speak for fear of
self-incrimination, then the mere fact the police call his attention to that right
does not elevate it to any higher level."); Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 A.2d
537, 540 (Pa. 1982) ("We do not think that the accused should be protected
only where there is governmental inducement of the exercise of the right. We
acknowledge that this position is more restrictive than that taken in Fletcher v.
Weir .... However, we decline to hold, under the Pennsylvania Constitution,
that the existence of Miranda warnings, or their absence, affects a person's le-
gitimate expectation not to be penalized for exercising the right to remain si-
lent.").
70. See Davis, 686 P.2d at 1146.
71. Coleman, 895 P.2d at 657; see also Protecting Doyle Rights, supra note
5, at 155 (discussing the constitutional limits placed on a prosecutor's use of
postarrest silence to impeach a partially silent defendant). This argument as-
sumes that police officers are aware of the distinction between Doyle and
Fletcher. Moreover, it assumes that police officers will engage in a calculated
determination of whether the suspect's silence will aid law enforcement (as-
suming the defendant takes the stand and says something that can be im-
peached) and further, that this benefit to police will outweigh the danger that
any statement made by the defendant might be inadmissible because of the
lack of Miranda warnings. But see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
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In sum, with respect to impeachment, federal law regarding
postarrest silence is clear: Under Doyle, if Miranda warnings are is-
sued, the admission of evidence of silence violates the Due Process
Clause. If no Miranda warnings are issued, under Fletcher there is
no federal constitutional prohibition to the admission of such evi-
dence. Admissibility of evidence of silence thus turns solely on
whether Miranda warnings are given.
Although federal constitutional law permits the admission of
postarrest, pre-Miranda silence, state constitutional law may in fact
preclude the introduction of such evidence. That is, some state
courts have construed their constitutional provisions of Due Process
or right against self-incrimination to preclude the introduction of
postarrest, pre-Miranda silence.
2. Case-in-chief
The Supreme Court has never considered whether admission of
a defendant's postarrest, pre-Miranda silence for purposes of estab-
lishing the government's case-in-chief is constitutional. Admission
of evidence of silence in the case-in-chief potentially poses a more
difficult question than impeachment. For example, impeachment
obviously occurs only after the defendant takes the stand and argua-
bly lies; the interest in preventing the acceptance of perjured testi-
mony may be sufficient to justify the introduction of otherwise in-
admissible evidence. 72 Or, some may believe that the defendant who
takes the stand and testifies waives his Fifth Amendment rights, and
thus evidence that may otherwise be constitutionally protected can
now be introduced.73 Given these factors, have the courts treated
evidence of postarrest, pre-Miranda silence for establishing guilt the
same as for impeachment? Several appellate courts have addressed
that issue, with varying results.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit faced this question in United
States v. Whitehead.74 There, Timothy Whitehead was arrested for
importation of marijuana shortly after he and his brother attempted to
(1971) ("[B]enefits of this [impeachment] process should not be lost... be-
cause of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be
encouraged thereby.").
72. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 224-26.
73. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
74. 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2000).
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drive into the United States from Mexico. 7' During that entry, the
immigration officer noted that there were no clothes nor anything
visible in Whitehead's car; when Whitehead opened the trunk in re-
sponse to a request by the official, the trunk was also empty.76 Find-
ing this suspicious, and believing that Whitehead was acting nervous,
the official referred Whitehead to a secondary inspection.77 There, a
narcotics-detecting dog alerted to the rear of Whitehead's car.78
At that point, Whitehead and his brother were placed in cus-
tody.79 Subsequently, customs officers searched Whitehead's car,
frisked and searched Whitehead's wallet and shoes, and had him re-
move his belt while Whitehead remained silent.80 Inside the rear
bumper of the car, the customs officer found brick-shaped packages
wrapped in cellophane; inside was a green leafy substance that later
proved to be marijuana.
8 1
During the trial, the officer was asked repeatedly whether
Whitehead ever asked what was found, what was "going on," or why
he was being arrested. In response to all these questions, the officer
answered no. During closing argument, the prosecutor then argued
to the jury that Whitehead stayed silent because he was guilty:
What do you do [when you've been detained and frisked
and searched]? ... What would anyone of us do? What is
going on here? What the heck is going on? Why I am [sic]
being treated like this? Why am I being arrested? But you
don't say that, if you know; and the defendant didn't say a
word because he knew. He knew there were drugs in the
car.
82
The Ninth Circuit held that such a line of inquiry, and such
comments by the prosecutor violated the defendant's Fifth
75. See id. at 636.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 637.
80. See id. at 636-37.
81. See id. at 637. To be specific, the inspectors found 54.85 pounds of
marijuana worth approximately $35,000. See id. at 639.
82. Id. at 638. Whitehead never took the stand, exercising his right to re-
main silent at trial. See id. at 639.
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Amendment rights.83 "'The fact of silence in the face of arrest'...
could not be used as substantive evidence of guilt, because that
would 'act [] as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the...
right to remain silent.'
84
Courts in the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit have also held that postarrest silence is inadmissible in the case-
in-chief.85  For example, in United States v. Moore,86 the police
stopped a car driving at a high rate of speed and passing through sev-
eral red lights without stopping. The driver of the car, Opio Moore,
agreed to a search of the car.88 In that search the officers found sev-
eral loaded weapons, including a semi-automatic pistol, and a large
quantity of cocaine around the car's battery. 89 Shortly thereafter,
Moore was arrested and later charged with unlawful possession with
83. See id. But the Ninth Circuit did not overturn the conviction; though it
was error to admit evidence, it was harmless error-it did not affect the out-
come. Comments on the defendant's failure to speak were scant, and the refer-
ence to the silence was incidental. Although the prosecutor's reference to the
defendant's silence in closing argument was more significant, the independent
overwhelming physical evidence of guilt was determinative. See id.
84. Id. at 638 (quoting Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir.
1978)).
85. See United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 384-89 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
United States v. Hemandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322-24 (7th Cir. 1991); see also
People v. Wanke, 726 N.E.2d 142 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that the prose-
cutor's use of evidence that the defendant invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination was plain error). In Wanke, the State argued that the fact that the
defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination showed he was lu-
cid, and thus disputed his insanity defense. The court held that the invocation
before the reading of Miranda warnings was irrelevant:
For the State to argue that there is a difference between pre- and post-
Miranda warnings is of no moment in this case. The issue here is not
the voluntariness of defendant's statement. It involves the State using
defendant's silence to prove that he was sane at the time of the inci-
dent. The State cannot use defendant's silence as knowledge of his
guilt. By doing so, the State improperly uses defendant's exercise of a
fundamental constitutional right as a proxy for sanity.
1d. at 145.
86. 104 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 380.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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intent to distribute cocaine, and using and carrying a firearm during a
drug trafficking offense.
90
At trial, when asked if Moore said anything when the drugs and
guns were found in the car, the officer answered, "No."91 In closing
argument, the prosecutor tried to use this silence to imply knowledge
of guns and drugs, and hence, that Moore was guilty of the offense of
possession: "[I]f Moore didn't know the stuff was underneath the
hood, [he] would at least look surprised. [He] would at least [have]
said, 'Well, I didn't know it was there.'
92
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that such use of
the defendant's silence violated the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination. 93 Although recognizing that no Supreme
Court case has explicitly ruled on pretrial silence and the Fifth
Amendment, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that
the Supreme Court has made clear that the protection of the Fifth
Amendment extends backward at least to the time of custodial inter-
rogation.94 Moreover, the appellate court found that the right should
extend even further-at least to the time of custody:
Although in the present case, interrogation per se had not
begun, neither Miranda nor any other case suggests that a
defendant's protected right to remain silent attaches only
upon the commencement of questioning as opposed to cus-
tody. While a defendant who chooses to volunteer an unso-
licited admission or statement to police before questioning
may be held to have waived the protection of that right, the
defendant who stands silent must be treated as having as-
serted it. Prosecutorial comment upon that assertion would
unduly burden the Fifth Amendment privilege. Addition-
ally, a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's post-
custodial silence unduly burdens that defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent at trial, as it calls a jury's
further attention to the fact that he has not arisen to remove
90. See id. at 379-80.
91. See id. at 384.
92. Id. The defense objected to these comments, but the judge overruled
the objection.
93. See id. at 389.
94. See id. at 385.
SILENCE
124 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:101
whatever taint the pretrial but post-custodial silence may
have spread. We therefore think it evident that custody and
not interrogation is the triggering mechanism for the right
of pretrial silence under Miranda. Any other holding would
create an incentive for arresting officers to delay interroga-
tion in order to create an intervening "silence" that could
then be used against the defendant.
95
Nor did the court find persuasive the fact that Moore had not yet
received any Miranda warnings. According to the appellate court,
the fact that the government has not provided the suspect with a lit-
any of his rights does not deny that those rights exist under the Fifth
Amendment. 96 Thus, the court concluded that "[tihe silence of an ar-
rested defendant.., is an exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights
which the Government cannot use to his prejudice.
9 7
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals admit-
ted evidence of silence during the postarrest, pre-Miranda period. In
United States v. Rivera,98 a customs inspector stopped three indi-
viduals traveling from Colombia at the Miami airport. After some
routine questions were asked and answered, the customs official de-
cided to examine each individual's luggage. 99 Inspection of the bags
revealed in each case an "obvious" false bottom; after puncturing the
bottoms with a screwdriver, white powder which later proved to be
cocaine was evident. The three individuals were then placed under
arrest, and read their Miranda rights. 00 A further search of the lug-
gage then ensued, and additional drugs were discovered. 1 1
At trial the customs official wanted to testify about the defen-
dants' silence-indeed, their indifference during the search and after
the arrest) z02 The appellate court held that the inspector's testimony
regarding the group's reaction to the search prior to the issuance of
Miranda warnings was admissible: "Schor's testimony about Vila's
95. Id.
96. See id. at 386-87.
97. Id. at 387. The court explicitly left the question of Fifth Amendment
rights for prearrest silence to another day. See id. at 387-88.
98. 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
99. See id. at 1565-66.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1567-68.
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reaction to his initial questioning prior to inspection of the... lug-
gage [comes prearrest] and therefore was not improper. In addition,
the government may comment on a defendant's silence when it oc-
curs after arrest, but before Miranda warnings are given."'
0 3
Although the Eleventh Circuit admitted postarrest, pre-Miranda
silence in the government's case-in-chief, the persuasiveness of the
opinion is open to question. First, the court reached its conclusion
with almost no analysis, simply stating the holding quoted above.
Second, its support for admitting such evidence in the case-in-chief
consisted of two cases which considered only the question of admis-
sibility of evidence of silence for impeachment purposes: Jenkins v.
Anderson and Fletcher v. Weir.
10 4
C. Prearrest, Pre-Miranda Silence
What rules govern a prearrest situation, which is typically prior
to any issuance of Miranda warnings? 10 5 For example, what if the
government wants to introduce the fact that prior to his arrest the
suspect never came forward to explain a criminal act, while at the
trial he claims to have acted in self-defense? 10 6 Or, what if the si-
lence occurs when the suspect is not in custody, but is being
103. Id. at 1568 n. 11 (citing Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 603).
104. See id. at 1568 nn.10-11 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231
(1980) which held that prearrest silence may be used to impeach a criminal de-
fendant's credibility); see also Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 (asserting that a de-
fendant is not denied Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the
prosecution's use of postarrest silence for impeachment purposes where the
record did not indicate a Miranda warning); Pettit, supra note 67, at 192-93
(stating that in Jenkins the prosecution cross-examined the defendant about the
defendant's prearrest silence in not going to the police to explain the occur-
rence). According to Jenkins a prosecutor may use prearrest silence to im-
peach a defendant's credibility if he takes the stand in his defense. See Jen-
kins, 447 U.S. at 238-40.
105. Miranda warnings are not required to be given unless the defendant is
subject to custodial interrogation. But when Miranda warnings are given pre-
arrest, these cases will likely be considered under Doyle. See Kappos v.
Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that even if an arrest has
not occurred, Doyle is applicable if Miranda warnings had been given); United
States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1981) (presenting an example of a
prearrest situation where the suspect was given his Miranda warnings).
106. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 231 (1980).
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questioned by the police? 10 7 Can silence in those circumstances be
used against him? Again, the courts have considered this question
with respect to both impeachment and use of the evidence in the
case-in-chief.
1. Impeachment
a. federal constitutional principles
In 1980, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment precluded the use of the defendant's prear-
rest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility. °8 In Jen-
kins v. Anderson the defendant was accused of first degree murder in
the stabbing death of Doyle Redding. 0 9 Although Redding was
killed on August 13, 1974, Jenkins did not turn himself in until two
weeks later. 110 At trial, he argued that he acted in self-defense, and
that Redding had attacked him first with a knife."' During cross-
examination, the prosecutor questioned Jenkins about his failure to
report the incident and his defense to the police:
Q: And I suppose you waited for the Police to tell them
what happened?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever go to a Police Officer or to anyone else
[besides your probation officer]?
A: No, I didn't.
112
107. Miranda warnings are only required to be issued when the suspect is
subject to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 435-42 (1984) (discussing the meaning of custody); Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980) (discussing the meaning of interrogation); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
108. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 231.
109. Id. at 232.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 232-33. The defendant had reported to the police that Red-
ding had robbed his sister; he argued that Redding in return attacked him in
anger. The prosecution maintained that Jenkins murdered Redding in retalia-
tion for the robbery. See id. at 232-33.
112. Id. at233.
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In closing argument, the prosecutor pointed out Jenkins' silence,
noting that he had waited two weeks before doing anything. 113 Jen-
kins was convicted of manslaughter."14
The Supreme Court rejected any constitutional challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence. 1 5 With respect to the Fifth Amend-
ment, the court considered "whether compelling the election [to
speak] impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the
[Fifth Amendment] 'i 116 and the "legitimacy of the challenged gov-
ernmental practice [of impeachment].""17
The court first rejected the notion that the values or policies of
the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent are offended when a per-
son is impeached with his prior silence.118 However, it did so with
almost no analysis; the court simply referred to past cases where it
had upheld such a practice of impeachment. 19 In those cases, the
court focused not on the decision to remain silent prior to arrest,
rather, they were concerned with the right to remain silent at trial. In
other words, the Supreme Court suggested:
that a defendant's real dilemma lies in determining whether
to testify or not; once a defendant has voluntarily taken the
stand, the rule that he must testify fully does not signifi-
cantly add to this dilemma and is indeed a defendant's obli-
gation, as the privilege against self-incrimination 'cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury.' 1
20
Besides minimizing the burden on the right to silence and de-
picting it as acceptable given the purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
113. See id. at 234.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 238-39 (citing 3A J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1042 (Chadboum
rev. 1970)).
116. Id. at 236 n.3 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23
(1973)). The Supreme Court noted that it was not clear whether the Fifth
Amendment protects prearrest silence, but held that assuming it does the
prosecutor's comments were constitutionally permissible.
117. Id. at 238 (citing Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 32 & n.20.
118. See id. at 236-38.
119. See id. at237-38.
120. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 281 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)).
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the court also lauded the legitimacy of impeachment on cross-
examination.
Attempted impeachment on cross-examination of a defen-
dant, the practice at issue here, may enhance the reliability
of the criminal process .... Once a defendant decides to
testify, '[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the
function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become
relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations de-
termining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-
incrimination.' 
1 21
Nor did the Supreme Court find persuasive the argument that
use of prearrest silence violates notions of fundamental fairness
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.122 First, the court noted
that the common law traditionally allowed witnesses to be im-
peached by their silence in appropriate circumstances.123 Moreover,
the court distinguished Doyle as applying only when there is gov-
ernment action inducing the defendant to remain silent.124 Since here
"[t]he failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into
custody and given Miranda warnings... the fundamental unfairness
present in Doyle is not present in this case. We hold that impeach-
ment by use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
125
Thus, a suspect's prearrest silence is admissible for impeach-
ment purposes. Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment
poses any obstacle to the use of silence in this context.
121. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 156 (1958)).
122. See id. at 238-39.
123. See id. at 239.
124. See id. at 239-40.
125. Id. at 240. Although Justice Powell wrote the majority opinions in both
Doyle and Jenkins, "they lie in uneasy tension with each other ...." R. Kent
Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 15, 60 (1981). As Professor Greenawalt explains, the reason may be that
some justices who joined Powell in Doyle dissented in Jenkins, while some
who joined the majority in Jenkins dissented in Doyle. "The opinions may
have been tailored to capture the votes of the particular justices in each major-
ity." Id. at 60 n.134.
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b. state constitutional decisions
While Jenkins permits evidence of prearrest silence, the decision
does not require state courts to do so. 126 Consequently, state courts
are divided on this issue. The Georgia Supreme Court interprets its
constitution to preclude admissibility of prearrest silence.127 It held
that "in criminal cases, a comment upon a defendant's silence or
failure to come forward is far more prejudicial than probative."'
128
The court declared that in all subsequent cases, a comment like that
made in the instant case "will not be allowed even where the defen-
dant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand
in his own defense."' 29 Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that the defendant was deprived of Due Process when the prose-
cution discussed his prearrest silence during closing arguments.
130
The court concluded that the prosecutor's comment regarding defen-
dant's failure to profess his innocence when the police pulled him
over was prejudicial.13' The court, however, did not specify whether
its holding was based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or
Kentucky's own constitutional Due Process provision.
Alternatively, some state courts embrace Jenkins, holding that
use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant violates neither his
Fifth nor Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court found no violation of Due Process and refused to interpret the
self-incrimination provision of the Wisconsin Constitution more lib-
erally than the Fifth Amendment. 132 Failing to distinguish between
prearrest and pre-Miranda silence, the court held that comment on
126. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240.
127. See Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Ga. 1991).
128. Id. But cf Mullinax v. State, 530 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that prearrest evidence of silence was admissible because it was
relevant to illustrate the circumstances of the arrest); Boykin v. State, 523
S.E.2d 605, 607 n.6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that where evidence of
prearrest silence was not barred because unlike Mallory, where defendant
merely failed to contact the police, the defendant in Boykin failed to respond to
officer's questions at the scene of the crime-thus, the evidence was admissi-
ble as part of the res gestae of the crime).
129. Mallory, 409 S.E.2d at 843.
130. See Churchwell v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 336, 338-39 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1992).
131. See id. at339.
132. See State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 90 (Wis. 1988).
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pre-Miranda silence is allowed once defendant elects to take the
stand. 133 Barring such cross-examination would permit the defen-
dant to "wrongfully manipulate the rules of evidence."'134 Further-
more, the court found that any potential prejudice created by such
comment can be adequately remedied by defendant's counsel on re-
direct. 135
2. Prearrest, pre-Miranda silence and the case-in-chief
a. federal law
There is no Supreme Court decision governing whether prear-
rest, pre-Miranda silence can be used not to impeach but to convict
the defendant-as substantive evidence of guilt. 136 Until recently,
the appellate courts were split: Three circuits held that the use of the
defendant's prearrest silence violates the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, and three other circuits held it did not.
137
133. See id. The court distinguished the case from State v. Fencl, 325
N.W.2d 703, 711 (Wis. 1982), where the defendant did not elect to testify and
the court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibited references to his pre-
Miranda silence.
134. Id.
135. See id.; see also Kidd v. State, 649 So. 2d 1304, 1307 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994) (holding that pursuant to Jenkins, comment on defendant's prearrest,
pre-Miranda silence is permissible).
136. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1996). In
Jenkins the Supreme Court explicitly refused to decide whether prearrest si-
lence can be used in the case-in-chief. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2.
137. The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had explicitly found a Fifth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that prearrest silence is inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment and principles of Griffin, but the error was harmless); Coppola v.
Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex rel. Savory v.
Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1987). But cf United States v. Daven-
port, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant voluntarily gave
the investigator some answers to questions, and refused to answer others; the
court stated that defendants cannot selectively assert the same self-
incriminating rights as those who take the stand).
The Second Circuit had expressed doubt whether evidence of prearrest
silence is admissible. See United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.
1981) ("[W]e are not confident that Jenkins permits even evidence that a sus-
pect remained silent before he was arrested or taken into custody to be used in
the Government's case-in-chief.").
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Specifically, the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had found that the
introduction of a defendant's prearrest, pre-Miranda silence violated
the Fifth Amendment, and the Second Circuit had at least expressed
some leanings in that direction.
On the other hand, the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits found
no constitutional violations in the admission of such evidence. 138 Fi-
nally, in February of 2000, the Sixth Circuit weighed in and, agree-
ing with the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, held that the right to
remain silent precluded the use of prearrest silence as substantive
evidence of guilt.1
39
In the Sixth Circuit case, the defendant, Ronald Combs, was
charged with murdering two women. 140 Almost immediately after
the murders, a police officer who was near the scene of the crime
shot him.14 ' In the ambulance, on the way to the hospital, another of-
ficer asked him what happened. 142 Combs then told the officer to
talk to his lawyer. 143
At trial, Combs' attorney did not deny that Combs had used his
gun; instead, he argued in defense that Combs was too intoxicated
from alcohol and drugs to form the requisite mental state for
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had held that there was no Fifth
Amendment violation in these circumstances. See United States v. Oplinger,
150 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d
590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (1 lth
Cir. 1991) (holding, without much discussion, that the government may com-
ment on a defendant's silence if it occurred prior to arrest, citing Jenkins).
The Ninth Circuit decision in Oplinger is interesting because as dis-
cussed supra, two years later, the appellate court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment is violated with the use of postarrest, pre-Miranda silence introduced in
the case-in-chief. See United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.
2000); supra text accompanying notes 74-84. The court distinguished the
situations by finding that prearrest, a suspect is under no compulsion to speak.
See Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 639.
Some state courts have also considered this issue. See, e.g., State v.
Rowland, 452 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Neb. 1990) (holding that prearrest silence can
be used for impeachment but not in the case-in-chief).
138. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1066-67; Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568; Zanabria,
74 F.3d at 593.
139. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000).
140. See id. at 278-79.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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premeditated murder. 144 Although Combs did not testify, the defense
called other witnesses to establish the extent of his alcohol and drug
ingestion. 1
45
To counter the defense, the government introduced the "talk to
my lawyer" statement to show that Combs understood what he was
doing. 46 The prosecutor explained in closing argument: "Talk to
my lawyer. Talk to my lawyer. Does that sound like someone who's
so intoxicated he doesn't know what is going on? Isn't that evidence
that he realizes the gravity of the situation?"'147 Combs was con-
victed, and sentenced to death. 1
48
The Sixth Circuit held that the introduction of the defendant's
prearrest silence (here, invoking the right to an attorney) 149 violated
the Fifth Amendment. The court first held that the privilege applies
in the prearrest setting:
The Supreme Court has given the privilege against self-
incrimination a broad scope ... it can be asserted in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, in-
vestigatory or adjudicatory; and it protects against any dis-
closures that the witness reasonably believes could be used
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence
that might be so used.' 50
The privilege against self-incrimination, according to the Sixth Cir-
cuit, is not tied to any stage or venue-it inures whenever there is the
danger that a person may be forced to incriminate himself. Thus, the
appellate court found that the Fifth Amendment applies whenever an
individual's comments could produce incriminating evidence, re-
gardless of whether it is a pre- or postarrest setting.'1
5
144. See id. at 273.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 279.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 273.
149. The statement requesting an attorney is treated as "silence." See supra
text accompanying note 10.
150. Combs, 205 F.3d at 283 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441,444-45 (1972)).
151. See Combs, 205 F.3d at 283. The court also suggests that even if the
Fifth Amendment only applies postarrest, it would be applicable to Combs be-
cause he was effectively in custody when he made his "talk to my lawyer"
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Once the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Fifth Amendment ap-
plied to Combs, the question became whether this right was violated
by the admission of the evidence. To make that assessment, the ap-
pellate court utilized the two pronged test set forth in Jenkins, con-
sidering first, whether admitting the evidence would subvert the poli-
cies behind the constitutional provision, and second, whether the
government's use of the evidence is a legitimate business practice.
152
With regards to the first question, the court concluded that the
use of prearrest silence "would substantially impair the policies be-
hind the privilege."'153 As the appellate court explained:
If... prearrest silence may be used as substantive evidence
of guilt regardless of whether or not the defendant testifies
at trial, then the defendant is cast into the very trilemma [of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt]. Because in the case
of substantive use a defendant cannot avoid the introduction
of his past silence by refusing to testify, the defendant is
under substantial pressure to waive the privilege against
self-incrimination either upon first contact with police or
later at trial in order to explain the prior silence. Perhaps
most importantly, use of a defendant's prearrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt substantially impairs the
"sense of fair play" underlying the privilege. Unlike in the
case of impeachment use, the use of a defendant's prior si-
lence as substantive evidence of guilt actually lessens the
prosecution's burden of proving each element of the
crime.1
5 4
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the use of the defendant's
prearrest silence in the case-in-chief was not a legitimate government
practice. 155 When used as substantive evidence of guilt, silence does
not enhance the truth-seeking function. Because silence is inherently
ambiguous the probative value of the evidence is extremely limited.
The "use of prearrest silence may even subvert the truthfnding
statement. Id. at 284.
152. Seeid. at285.
153. Id.
154. Id. For further discussion of the values and policies behind the Fifth
Amendment refer to notes 257-263 and accompanying text.
155. See Combs, 205 F.3d at 285.
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process; because it pressures the defendant to explain himself' and
thus increases the likelihood of perjury.1
56
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Fifth Amendment in
finding that prearrest silence was inadmissible. There, a fourteen-
year-old boy suspected of brutally murdering two friends, refused to
talk to the police prior to his arrest.' 57 After police officers testified
to his refusal, the prosecution argued in closing that this silence was
indicative of guilt: "The defendant, what did he say... ? 'I don't
want to talk about it. I won't make any statements.' This... appar-
ent good friend... doesn't want to talk about it, doesn't want to help
the police at that time.. .. "158
The appellate court noted that the right to remain silent applies
prearrest: "The right to remain silent, unlike the right to counsel, at-
taches before the institution of formal adversary proceedings."'' 59
Because the right against self-incrimination attached, the prosecutor
cannot invite the jury to draw an inference of guilt from defendant's
invocation of that right. The appellate court analogized to the Su-
preme Court's holding in Griffin v. California that no inference of
guilt can be drawn from an accused's failure to take the stand at
trial. 160 While Griffin involved governmental use of the defendant's
silence at trial, rather than silence which occurred when questioned
by police prearrest, the Seventh Circuit concluded that these differ-
ences are irrelevant. The basic right against self-incrimination is the
same in either case.'
6 1
Other appellate courts disagree with these decisions, holding
that the use of prearrest silence poses no constitutional problems.
For example, the Ninth Circuit considered the question of prearrest
silence as substantive evidence of guilt in United States v. Oplin-
ger. 16 2 William Oplinger was employed as a supply coordinator for
156. Id.
157. See Savory, 832 F.2d at 1017.
158. Id. at 1015.
159. Id. at 1017.
160. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
161. See Lane, 832 F.2d at 1017; see also United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d
1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991) (relying on Griffin).
162. 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998). As mentioned previously, the Ninth
Circuit recently reaffirmed Oplinger in the course of finding that postarrest si-
lence cannot be admitted in the government's case-in-chief. See Whitehead,
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the Heritage Bank and thus was in charge of purchasing the supplies
for Heritage's offices in Washington. 163 In 1995, his employer dis-
covered evidence leading them to believe that Oplinger was engaged
in theft. Specifically, Oplinger was believed to be purchasing
unnecessary supplies from Costco, and then returning those supplies
for cash refunds-which he pocketed.164
After the alleged theft was suspected by the company, two Heri-
tage Bank officials met with Oplinger, showed him the documenta-
tion they uncovered and asked him to explain it.165 When pressed for
an explanation, Oplinger "leaned back in his chair, placed his hands
over his eyes and said he did not know."'166 When the bank official
told him that he would be fired if he could not account for the
money, Oplinger simply repeated that he did not know.
167
At trial, the bank official testified to Oplinger's comments (or
lack thereof) at the meeting. Moreover, in closing argument, the
prosecution commented upon Oplinger's behavior:
It was explained to him, it would have to be reported to the
FBI and the bank's regulators. Did he give a response or an
explanation? No .... Did he rant and rave and scream
about being charged unjustly with stealing? No .... Did he
call Costco and scream about them lying to the bank about
merchandise he was returning? No. Does this sound like
the conduct of an innocent person? Of course it doesn't.
168
The Ninth Circuit held that this use of prearrest, pre-Miranda si-
lence as substantive evidence of guilt was constitutional. 69 When
silence occurs in the period pre-custody, the appellate court held that
it neither offends the Fifth Amendment nor Due Process to admit it
in the government's case-in-chief. Doyle and the Due Process con-
cerns expressed therein do not aid the defendant, because there was
200 F.2d at 639 ("We strictly limited our ruling in Oplinger to the period
'[p]rior to custody'....").
163. See Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1063-64.
164. See id. at 1064.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 1066.
169. See id. at 1066-67.
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no governmental inducement to remain silent. 170 Nor is there any
Fifth Amendment concern. Relying on Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion in Jenkins, the court noted that the Fifth Amendment has
never been applied to prevent the use of testimony which was not
compelled. 171 Prior to custody, the government here made no effort
to compel Oplinger to speak-he was under no official compulsion
whatsoever, either to speak or to remain silent.
172
Unlike in Combs, Oplinger was questioned before arrest by pri-
vate parties, not government officials. 73 The appellate court recog-
nized that this might be a significant distinction between its holding
and those of the other circuits that have found a Fifth Amendment
violation:
Notably, perhaps, in [those cases where the Fifth Amend-
ment was violated], the party seeking to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination was questioned by a government
official.... Such was not the case here. There was no gov-
ernment involvement in the meeting between Oplinger and
his employers; it was strictly a matter of private concern be-
tween private individuals. 1
74
Other circuit courts, however, have found no constitutional im-
pediment to introducing prearrest silence even when government
agents are involved. In United States v. Zanabria,175 for example,
Miguel Zanabria was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute after nearly three kilos of cocaine were found in his lug-
gage during a customs search at Houston International Airport.
176
Although Zanabria did not testify, his wife took the stand and testi-
fied that Zanabria's actions were the product of duress: They owed
money to a third person who had threatened harm against their
daughter, and thus, Zanabria was importing the cocaine to pay off the
debt and save his daughter.
177
170. See id. at 1067 n.5.
171. See id. at 1067.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1064.
174. Id. at 1067 n.6 (citations omitted).
175. 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
176. See id. at 592.
177. See id.
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The arresting officer, however, testified that prior to his arrest,
Zanabria did not mention any threats against his daughter, or that he
needed any kind of help. 178 In closing argument, the prosecution re-
minded the jury that these alleged threats were never reported to au-
thorities here or in Colombia (where the child was located). 179
The appellate court held that the references to Zanabria's prear-
rest silence were not erroneous:
[T]he record makes manifest that the silence at issue was
neither induced by nor a response to any action by a gov-
ernment agent. The [F]iffh [A]mendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination but does not, as Zanabria sug-
gests, preclude the proper evidentiary use and prosecutorial
comment about every communication or lack thereof by the
defendant which may give rise to an incriminating infer-
ence. 1
8 0
Thus, the federal appellate courts are split concerning the admis-
sibility of prearrest silence in the case-in-chief. Seven circuits have
reached this issue; four courts of appeal have held that evidence of
silence cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt, while three
circuits find no constitutional limitations to the use of such evidence.
b. state courts' use ofprearrest, pre-Miranda
silence in the case-in-chief
Like their federal counterparts, the state courts are split on
whether the use of prearrest silence as substantive evidence violates
either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments or their own state consti-
tutional provisions. For example, courts in New Jersey, 181 Mary-184 185 unnFit
land,'8 2 Vermont,8 3 Wisconsin, and Texas have found no Fifth
178. See id. at 593.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See State v. Dreher, 695 A.2d 672, 702 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997); see also State v. Kiser, 683 A.2d 1021, 1029 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)
(holding that the Doyle rule has no application unless the defendant has re-
mained silent in reliance on the implied assurance of the Miranda warnings).
182. See Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 1305 (Md. 1998). In this case, the sus-
pect was not in custody (he was in his home) and was not being interrogated by
the police. He remained silent when his wife told the police, within his hearing
range, that he had beaten her. Although the police officer was present, the
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Amendment violation in the use of prearrest silence absent some
government compulsion to speak. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court
noted:
If a situation is neither coercive nor curtails one's freedom
of action ... the right to silence is not implicated. If a de-
fendant was silent in circumstances which did not trigger
his or her right against compelled self-incrimination, the
prosecution is free to comment on, or elicit testimony of,
that silence.1
8 6
The Arizona Supreme Court held that prosecutorial comment on pre-
Miranda silence either before or after arrest did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment.1
87
On the other hand, numerous state courts have held that admis-
sion of prearrest silence violates constitutional principles. For exam-
ple, the state supreme courts in Washington' 88 and Nebraska' 89 found
court found that the suspect was under no official compulsion to speak or to
remain silent, and thus the use of his silence as evidence did not burden his
Fifth Amendment rights. See id. at 1311.
183. See State v. Villarreal, 617 P.2d 541, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (stating
that prearrest, pre-Miranda silence is not admissible in the case-in-chief when
made to a police officer); State v. Houle, 642 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Vt. 1994) (stat-
ing that prearrest silence does not violate the Fifth Amendment without gov-
ernnent compulsion to speak or remain silent in the case-in-chief); see also
Commonwealth v. Cull, 656 A.2d 476, 481 n.5 (Pa. 1995) (indicating that the
tacit admission rule is not allowed where the defendant is in police custody or
in the presence of police officers because of the right against self-
incrimination).
184. See State v. Adams, 584 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
185. See Harris v. State, 866 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App. 1993); Waldo v.
State, 746 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
186. Adams, 584 N.W.2d at 699.
187. See State v. Ramirez, 871 P.2d 237, 246 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc).
188. See State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Wash. 1996); see also
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that Fifth
Amendment rights exist prior to custodial interrogation; a contrary rule would
encourage police to refrain from issuing Miranda warnings). The Minnesota
courts have taken an interesting approach. They have held that the use of pre-
Miranda, prearrest silence is inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief only when
the defendant has been counseled by an attorney to remain silent. See State v.
Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d 425,428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
189. See State v. Rowland, 452 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Neb. 1990) (stating that
prearrest silence is admissible for impeachment but not for the case-in-chief,
relying on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) and United States ex rel
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that the Fifth Amendment did preclude use of prearrest silence in the
case-in-chief.
Moreover, courts in Virginia 190 and Wyoming,' 9' have inter-
preted their own state constitutional provisions to exclude the use of
such evidence. In finding a violation under the Wyoming constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination, the court stressed,
[W]e discern no rational reason to limit the protection em-
bracing the citizen's right to silence to the postarrest or
post-Miranda situation. The constitutional right to silence
exists at all times-before arrest, at arrest, and after arrest;
before a Miranda warning and after it. The right is self-
executing.
... [Thus] an accused is presumed to be exercising the right
by his silence, prearrest and pre-Miranda when questioned
by the state's agents for purposes of a criminal investiga-
tion. Accordingly, the prosecutorial use of the citizen's si-
lence to infer the guilt of the citizen is constitutionally pro-
hibited.
192
Moreover, the court expressed some policy concerns for exclud-
ing prearrest silence:
Under the erroneous view that no constitutional right to
prearrest silence exists, a citizen who stands mute in the
face of accusatory interrogation about the crime during a
law enforcement investigation ... is without constitutional
protection. . . . Law enforcement personnel can time the
citizen's arrest to occur after the citizen stands mute in the
face of the accusation. This practice, which encourages
manipulative timing of arrests, does not serve the constitu-
tional provision's purpose of protecting the right to silence
.... Permitting prosecutorial use of that silence discourages
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987)).
190. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 495 S.E.2d 522, 529 (Va. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that the use of prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt
violates the privilege against self-incrimination under Article I, Section 8 of
Virginia Constitution).
191. See, e.g., Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995); see also
Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978) (holding that under the state
constitution, any comment on an accused's right to silence is prejudicial).
192. Tortolito, 901 P.2d at 390 (footnote omitted).
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a law enforcement system's reliance upon extrinsic evi-
dence independently secured through skillful investigation
and, instead, encourages reliance upon compulsory self-
disclosure. 193
C. A Summary of the Rules
The various rules governing the use of pretrial silence are as fol-
lows: (1) Under Doyle postarrest, post-Miranda silence is not admis-
sible for any purpose; 194 (2) Under Fletcher'95 postarrest, pre-
Miranda silence is admissible for impeachment purposes (there is no
federal Supreme Court case governing admission in the case-in-chief
and the lower federal courts and state courts have reached conflicting
conclusions with respect to this issue); (3) Prearrest, pre-Miranda si-
lence is admissible under Jenkins for impeachment purposes.
9 6
Again, there is no Supreme Court decision concerning the case-in-
chief and the lower federal and state courts are split.
III. TOWARDS A COHESIVE APPROACH:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULES CONCERNING SILENCE
In the previous sections, the rules concerning silence in the vari-
ous settings, pre- or postarrest, pre- or post-Miranda, were set forth.
The essence of the rules is easily stated: Postarrest, post-Miranda si-
lence is inadmissible for impeachment purposes or for use in the
government's case-in-chief. Silence occurring before a suspect re-
ceives his Miranda warnings, however, is admissible for impeach-
ment purposes, but may not be for the case-in-chief.
Here, these rules will be critically analyzed: Do the rules reflect
the appropriate constitutional values and properly weigh the interests
of society and individual rights? Moreover, the rules will be as-
sessed for the value of consistency: Do they make sense as a whole
scheme?
This Article concludes that the rules do not make sense. Rather
than the confusing myriad of rules turning on whether the silence
193. Id.
194. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-19 (1975).
195. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1981).
196. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1980).
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was pre- or postarrest, or post-Miranda, and whether it is being used
for impeachment or in the case-in-chief, this Article proposes a sim-
ple one: Pretrial silence should not be admissible based on the Due
Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment.
First, this Article argues that the Due Process Clause should pre-
clude the admission of evidence of silence, but not because the de-
fendant "relied" on the government's promise. Rather, such evi-
dence violates Due Process because it is inherently ambiguous.
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-
incrimination also precludes the introduction of evidence of pretrial
silence whether used for impeachment or in the case-in-chief. Thus,
this Article urges a reconsideration of the (cursory) analysis in
Fletcher, arguing that the introduction of silence constitutes a penalty
on the exercise of a constitutional right without any countervailing
societal benefit.
A. Due Process and the Admission of Silence
Although the Supreme Court in Doyle suggested two justifica-
tions for excluding evidence of silence post-Miranda-the inherent
ambiguity of silence, and reliance on the government's promise-
subsequent cases made clear that only the latter mattered. 197 The
Due Process analysis as currently articulated by the courts does not
make sense because "reliance" is a weak basis for distinguishing be-
tween pre- and post-Miranda situations.
On the other hand, the "forgotten" justification-that the evi-
dence is inherently ambiguous-does make sense and it should be-
come the centerpiece of a viable Due Process claim. This justifica-
tion, moreover, applies for silence which occurs pretrial, whether
before or after the issuance of Miranda warnings.
1. A critical analysis of the "reliance" argument-should we
distinguish between admissible and nonadmissible
silence based on Miranda?
There is a strong argument to be made that a Due Process viola-
tion should not turn on whether police officers actually read a
197. See, e.g., id. at 240 (stating that Miranda warnings provide assurance
that subsequent silence cannot be used against a person).
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suspect the Miranda warnings. The essence of the Due Process vio-
lation expressed in Doyle is this: It is fundamentally unfair for a
suspect to rely on the government's assurance that his silence will
not be used against him to then be penalized for such silence.
198
When police officers read a suspect the Miranda fights and the sus-
pect decides to stay silent, the suspect will be presumed to be relying
on the government's promise not to use the silence against him.'99
To permit the government to use a person's silence against him in the
face of such a promise is unfair.2 °0
Isn't it possible, however, that a suspect who is not read his
Miranda rights by the police is relying on those exact same-albeit
unstated-assurances? As previously discussed, numerous courts-
including the Supreme Court-and many scholars have noted that
knowledge of the Miranda warnings have become a fixture of popu-
lar culture.20' Thus, given this pervasive knowledge of the Miranda
warnings, is the "unfair reliance" any different between the warned
and unwamed defendant? Granted, the government is not explicitly
promising the suspect that his silence will not be used against him.
But the same is true even when Miranda warnings are read to a sus-
pect. The promise itself is unstated-it is implicit. The Miranda
warnings simply tell a person that he has the fight to remain silent,
and that should he speak, it could be used against him in a court of
law. The implicit inference is that should he choose not to speak, it
cannot be used against him. It seems disingenuous to claim that the
government's promise must actually be spoken when in reality it has
never been an explicit message.
198. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
199. See id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions since Doyle have tried to mini-
mize this element. Nonetheless, the Doyle court did place equal emphasis
upon it.
201. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998) ("And as for the
possibility that the person under investigation may be unaware of his right to
remain silent: In the modem age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warn-
ings, that is implausible."). The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that
the warnings have entered the popular culture and are widely known. See
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Pettit, supra note 67, at
181 and accompanying text.
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The weakness of the Due Process argument turning on the actual
giving of Miranda warnings can be demonstrated by a few hypotheti-
cals. Suppose, for example, that an arrested suspect is told by his at-
torney, and not the police, that he has the right to remain silent,
which is precisely what he is advised to do. Under Doyle, he cannot
make a Due Process argument, although presumably he is relying on
the exact same implicit promise, albeit delivered by his attorney, and
not the police. Yet isn't the reliance the same? Moreover, the proba-
tive value of the evidence is precisely the same. The probative value
of silence certainly is no different when silence follows the Miranda
warning given by the police rather than an attorney.
20 2
Here is another example. What about an arrested suspect who,
prior to receiving any Miranda warnings, blurts out to the police: "I
know my rights. I'm not saying a word to you guys." And he
doesn't. Is his silence any less a reliance on a presumed government
promise that silence won't be used against him?203 Is there any
greater probative value to his silence than for a person who is read
his rights and then remains mute? The answer to both questions
202. See Protecting Doyle Rights, supra note 5, at 161 n.37. But see State v.
Crosby, 641 A.2d 406, 409-10 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994) (distinguishing Leecan);
State v. Leecan, 504 A.2d 480, 488 (Conn. 1986) (stating that the advice given
by a court or clerk was not the functional equivalent of Miranda warnings for
Doyle purposes, and "neither the police nor any other government personnel..
. induced the defendant's postarrest silence because the defendant said he re-
mained silent on the advice of his attorney). The Second Circuit, on habeas
review, disagreed. See Leecan v. Lopes, 893 F.2d 1434, 1440 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that "[t]he admonition Leecan concededly received from the judge at
arraignment... is not materially distinguishable from a warning delivered by
police prior to custodial interrogation"); see also State v. Lofquest, 418
N.W.2d 595, 596 (Neb. 1988) (indicating that the county judge's provision of
Miranda warnings triggers Doyle rights). The courts in Minnesota have ex-
panded the protection afforded the defendant to render inadmissible counseled
prearrest, pre-Miranda silence. See State v. Billups, 264 N.W.2d 137, 139
(Minn. 1978) (stating that an attorney's warning to remain silent is equated
with being given Miranda warnings). But see Grancorvitz v. Franklin, 890
F.2d 34, 43 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that silence resulting from an attorney's
advice "does not automatically transform silence into constitutionally protected
silence").
203. Or, let's make it even harder. Suppose the suspect says: "I know my
rights-you guys arrested me last week and told me them. So don't bother
reading them to me-I'm saying nothing."
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clearly is "no." No principled distinction in reliance and no mean-
ingful difference in probative value is evident.
Assuming that concerns about fundamental fairness cannot turn
on the factual happenstance that the police officer actually read the
suspect the Miranda warnings, the question then becomes: Where do
we draw the line? Consistency merely suggests that the distinction
between pre- and post-Miranda is not a viable one; it does not sug-
gest a resolution. One can be consistent at this point by either man-
dating the exclusion of evidence in both cases, or in neither.
The point is this: The reliance argument is a weak argument
upon which to base the Due Process analysis. It is not a principled
basis for distinguishing between pre- and post-Miranda situations.
By itself, it cannot establish a line between the inclusion and exclu-
sion of evidence. Moreover, it appears to be a particularly suscepti-
ble ground for change. If the government and courts want to include
evidence of silence, then presumably all they need to do is add a sen-
tence to the Miranda warnings: And if you do stay silent, this can be
introduced if you take the stand in a subsequent trial. That may raise
Fifth Amendment questions, as will be discussed below, but no
longer is there any unfair reliance on the government's promise.
20 4
Thus, instead of relying on a reliance argument, the Due Process ap-
proach should return to its "roots": The inherent ambiguity of the
evidence.
2. Evaluating the probative nature of the evidence-the inherent
ambiguity of silence
In Doyle the Supreme Court held that Due Process was violated
not only because it is unfair to punish someone for relying on a gov-
ernment promise, but also because the evidence of post-Miranda si-
lence is so inherently ambiguous and prejudicial that its introduction
violated fundamental fairness. Although subsequent courts have dis-
regarded that latter point, it is an argument that is worthy of recon-
sideration. Moreover, the argument made in Doyle should be ex-
tended: The evidence of silence is inexorably ambiguous whether
that silence occurred post-Miranda, pre-Miranda, or even prearrest.
204. See Snyder, supra note 34, at 295.
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Silence is probative only in circumstances where, first, it would
be expected that the person speak out, and second, when the only
reasonable interpretation of the silence is one inconsistent with the
person's statements at trial or with innocence.20 5 Both of these as-
sumptions are highly suspect.
Perhaps the easiest case to make is for the ambiguity of postar-
rest silence. Arrest is "not an occasion when circumstances naturally
call upon a defendant to speak out. ' 206 As the Supreme Court noted:
"At the time of arrest... innocent and guilty alike-perhaps particu-
larly the innocent-may find the situation so intimidating that they
may choose to stand mute.
'20 7
Moreover, rarely will it be the case that silence is truly inconsis-
tent with the trial statement-that there is no other explanation con-
sistent with silence.20 8 In most circumstances, a person's failure to
respond to police inquiries, or the situation of arrest, is highly am-
biguous. 0 9
There are a number of factors that may motivate a person to re-
main silent besides tacitly admitting the truth of an accusation. For
example, as mentioned earlier, a person may well be afraid, shocked,
or intimidated, and thus, stay silent. The defendant may believe that
205. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (stating that
the threshold inconsistency between silence and a statement at trial must be es-
tablished or else silence lacks any probative value).
206. State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 771 (Fla. 1998).
207. Hale, 422 U.S. at 177. Hale was a postarrest, post-Miranda case de-
cided before Doyle. Hale was arrested for robbery, taken to the police station,
and advised of his right to remain silent. He was then searched, and found to
possess $158 in cash. When asked by an officer, "Where did you get the
money?" Hale did not respond. Id. at 174. At trial, Hale testified that his es-
tranged wife had given him the money to purchase some money orders. On
cross-examination, he admitted that he did not tell the police officer where the
money was from because he "didn't feel that it was necessary at the time" to
tell the officer. Id. The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory powers and
reversed a federal court's decision to allow impeachment use of pretrial si-
lence. The court concluded that the probative value of Hale's postarrest, post-
Miranda silence was insignificant because Hale may have been intimidated by
the setting, and he would not have expected the police to release him merely on
the strength of his explanation. Any value to the evidence, moreover, was
deemed outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. See id. at 180.
208. See State v. Leecan, 504 A.2d 480, 484 (Conn. 1986).
209. See Hale, 422 U.S. at 176 ("In most circumstances silence is so am-
biguous that it is of little probative force.").
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speaking out would be futile210 or may simply distrust the police.2 1'
Or, a suspect may simply remain silent because he has been in-
structed by his attorney to do so, or because he is aware of his
Miranda rights and decides to invoke them. He may be afraid that he
would incriminate others, or implicate himself in other crimes.
21 2
Finally, the suspect may believe that he has committed no crime, and
thus has no need to explain himself. 213 He may, in fact, be unwilling
to proclaim his innocence, out of righteous indignation at being ac-
cused of any wrongdoing. All of these reasons make any failure to
speak inherently ambiguous, and, according to some state courts,
render it impossible to conclude that the circumstances naturally call
for a person to speak out.
214
Thus when considering the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence,
many state judges rely on these factors to find it inadmissible as a
matter of state evidence law.215  Typical of this approach is the
210. See id. at 179.
211. The distrust of certain police officers has been shown to be a legitimate
concern lately, at least in Los Angeles. The so-called "Rampart" scandal, in-
volving a Los Angeles police department in the Rampart division, has re-
vealed, among other things, numerous police officers planting evidence on in-
nocent defendants. The scandal has received significant national attention.
See Symposium, The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal Justice System,
34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 537 (2001); Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 10 More Convic-
tions Are Overturned Due to LAPD Probe, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at A8;
see also People v. Fondron, 157 Cal. App. 3d 390, 399, 204 Cal. Rptr. 457,
463 (1984) (an individual may refrain from speaking because he believes it
would be futile, or distrusts the police, and thus shuns any involvement or con-
tact with them).
212. Cf Webb v. State, 347 So. 2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(when asked if he told the police about being elsewhere at the time of the
crime, the defendant responded, "[W]ell, sir, I didn't tell the police anything
because I have come to a realization that I just do not, I don't talk to the police
when it involves anything that has to do with the possibility of me going to
jail.").
213. See Farley v. State, 717 P.2d 111, 112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); see
also People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. 1981) (detailing the rea-
sons why a person may not speak).
214. See, e.g., Hoggins, 718 So. 2d at 771.
215. See, e.g., People v. Sheperd, 551 P.2d 210, 211-12 (Ct. App. Colo.
1976) (citing Hale, 422 U.S. at 195, that failure to come to police before arrest
is inadmissible as evidence because it lacks probative value); Farley, 717 P.2d
at 113 (holding that prearrest silence cannot be used to impeach because it is
not probative); Conyers, 420 N.E.2d at 935-36 (stating that absent unusual cir-
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decision in Silvernail v. State.216 There, the defendant, Reginald
Silvemail, allegedly engaged in a crime spree, including murder,
with Richard Holland and Robert Hughes.217 He was arrested, along
with others, after Holland attempted to shoplift from a supermar-
ket.2" He was originally detained, and then arrested a short time
later when the police learned he had an outstanding warrant for a
misdemeanor.
At the trial, Silvemail testified on his own behalf, and asserted a
defense of duress.220 He argued that the others were responsible for
the murder, and that he helped load and unload the body only be-
cause Holland threatened that he was next if he did not participate.
221
Thus, Silvemail argued on the stand that he feared for his life.222
During cross-examination, Silvemail was asked about his failure
to claim duress when he was first stopped by the police and when he
was arrested:
"Q: When Officer Gaines came... did you say to him,
'God, I'm glad you're here'.
A: No....
Q: You never said, 'Gee, I'm relieved. You're finally here
to help me,' right?
A: No, I didn't say that.,
223
Silvemail was convicted of second-degree murder and kidnapping.
224
The court found that the silence should not be admissible to im-
peach the defendant, concluding that "[a]t best, Silvemail's silence
was highly ambiguous.,, 22 5 After detailing various reasons why a
suspect might not assert a duress defense to the officers immediately
upon arrest, the court noted that Silvemail's actions simply might
cumstances, evidence of prearrest silence is inadmissible even when offered
solely to impeach).
216. 777 P.2d 1169 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
217. See id. at 1171.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 1172-73.
224. Id. at 1172.
225. Id. at 1176.
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have reflected his awareness of and reliance on his right to remain
silent.226 Or, Silvemail might have been afraid to discuss the murder,
fearing that the police might not believe him.227 Thus, the court con-
cluded that "[a]ssuming Silvemail's claim of duress to have been
true, it would hardly seem 'natural under the circumstances' ... for
him to have disclosed his claim to the police. To the contrary, the far
more 'natural' decision may well have been to maintain a prudent si-
lence for the time being. 22 8
All of the above arguments concern postarrest silence-the
question is whether the same considerations of probative value
should be any different prearrest. Arguably, yes. While a suspect
may not be expected to respond once arrested, the same assumption
may not be true during an earlier and potentially less confrontational
stage. Moreover, since Miranda warnings likely have not been
given, suspects may not be relying on the right to remain silent. Ac-
cordingly, some courts have drawn a distinction between the proba-
tive value of statements made pre- and postarrest.
This distinction, however, is not warranted. Virtually all of the
factors explaining why silence is inherently ambiguous in the postar-
rest context apply prearrest; indeed, some of the factors are even
more salient before the arrest than after. For example, a person may
be aware that he is under no obligation to speak at any time, not sim-
ply after an arrest, and may even feel less need to speak out in the
prearrest stage. Some people are afraid and suspicious of the police,
and may avoid any encounters---or cooperation-with such authority
at any time.
229
226. See id. at 1178.
227. See id.
228. Id. (quoting Hale, 422 U.S. at 176). The court did note that the situa-
tion might have been different were he still under a threat from Holland at the
time the police took him into custody. "Silvemail's silence might have been
considerably less ambiguous if it appeared from his testimony that the police
had rescued him from imminent peril. But this was not the case .... [A]t the
time [they] were stopped, Silvemail no longer had any immediate cause to be
fearful. He was aware that Holland had already been taken into custody and no
longer posed a threat." Id.
229. See supra text accompanying note 211. Distrust of police is not a new
phenomenon. Even in Doyle, when one defendant was asked why he did not
provide his innocent explanation to the police, the defendant responded: "[I]n
the last eight months to a year there has been so many implications ... in the
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Moreover, if the questioning occurs immediately after the crimi-
nal event, albeit prearrest, the shock and confusion may be even
greater than that which is felt later.230 Finally, the indignation that
may explain a suspect's silence may be even greater prearrest, when
the police simply may be responding to rumors or innuendo than
hard facts. Thus, whether pre- or postarrest, the evidence of silence
should be deemed inherently ambiguous, and hence, not probative.
231
Of course, there are exceptional circumstances where the evi-
dence of silence is probative. There may be unique cases where one
is under some sort of duty to come forward and provide an explana-
tion. For example, in one case the court found that the circumstances
were such that the defendant-a police officer-was essentially un-
der a duty to speak up before trial. 232 The police officer, charged
with larceny, claimed at trial that he had been acting as an under-
cover agent when he took the money, and therefore, maintained that
he had not obtained the money illegally.233 The court permitted the
prosecutor to introduce his failure to raise this defense pretrial, not-
ing that the officer was under an obligation to inform his superiors of
any undercover activities, and thus his silence in the face of accusa-
tions by fellow officers occurred in a setting where it was both un-
reasonable for a person not to speak, and highly relevant to the
credibility of the defendant's trial testimony.234
Moreover, there may be circumstances where the above factors
are not salient at all. For example, assume that pretrial a person
paper and law enforcement that are setting people up and busting them for nar-
cotics and stuff." Doyle, 426 U.S. at 625 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. See People v. DeGeorge, 541 N.E.2d 11, 14 (N.Y. 1989) (indicating
that when questioned after the shooting, the defendant stated he was numb,
scared, in a cold sweat, and unable to recall the conversation with police).
231. See id.; see also Ex parte Marek, 556 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala. 1989)
(eliminating the "tacit admission" rule as a matter of state evidence law); State
v. Daniels, 556 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (stating that the pres-
ence of police and the emotional state of the victim rendered the defendant's
choice to remain silent ambiguous); State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 926-27
(Iowa 1972) (recognizing the ambiguity of prearrest silence and proscribing
the use of tacit admission); Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa.
1967) (prohibiting tacit admission when the defendant is in police custody or
in the presence of a police officer).
232. See People v. Rothschild, 320 N.E.2d 639, 639 (N.Y. 1974).
233. See id. at 640-41.
234. See id. at 641-42.
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accuses a friend of taking money from her. The accused says noth-
ing. While some righteous indignation may apply here, none of the
other factors do. In other words, when a third party, not a police of-
ficer or a representative of the state, makes an accusation the silence
may be more probative.
Consider another example where silence does not really involve
the state. A man shoots another person, and claims at trial that he
shot the victim by mistake-his gun went off accidentally. He is
asked during cross-examination: Did you tell the police when ar-
rested that you acted in self-defense? Answer-No. This is imper-
missible questioning because there are a multitude of reasons why a
person might not speak to the police in this situation-the silence is
inherently ambiguous. He may have felt frightened, afraid that the
police would not believe him. He may have been told by a lawyer
not to say anything. All of these explanations are totally consistent
with the accident explanation.
But what if the following takes place during cross-examination:
Question: Did you know that the victim was alive after you shot
him?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Did you get help for him--did you call a hospital or
an ambulance?
Answer: No.
Is this line of questioning a violation of due process? Certainly
not. First, it might not even be silence at all-it seems like those
"what did you do next" questions.235 Even if it is considered a use of
silence-because after all the jury is being asked to draw an adverse
inference from the defendant's nonaction and silence, it could be
admissible. It may fall under the "duty" exception-a person who
hurts another may have a duty not to cause further harm. More sig-
nificantly, because it does not involve accusation by or involvement
with the government, the factors suggesting that silence is not proba-
tive are not present.
Thus, except in those two extremely limited circumstances-
when there is some independent duty to come forward, or where the
alleged silence occurs after an accusation by a private person in
235. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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circumstances where a response would normally be forthcoming-
the evidence of silence is inherently ambiguous. Silence is simply
not probative evidence.
Moreover, admission of such evidence also thwarts the truth-
seeking function. The evidence is unduly prejudicial. Numerous
courts have found that evidence of silence has significant potential
for undue prejudice. As the Supreme Court itself recognized,
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more
weight to the defendant's previous silence than is war-
ranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the reasons
for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative
inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that
the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest.236
Hence, the introduction of such evidence does not enhance, but may
even frustrate the truth-seeking function of the trial. Evidence of si-
lence obfuscates the truth.
The above arguments attempt to show that the use of silence
violates the Due Process Clause when used in any context at trial:
impeachment or in the case-in-chief. Even if the Due Process argu-
ments were found to be unpersuasive, there is an independent ground
to exclude pretrial evidence of silence: The Fifth Amendment guar-
antee that individuals not be compelled to incriminate themselves.
B. The Fifth Amendment and Silence
Does the Fifth Amendment preclude the use of silence, either in
the case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes? The Fifth Amend-
ment provides that "[n]o Person... shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself.,23 7 The Amendment was
236. Hale, 422 U.S. at 180; see also Wills v. State, 573 A.2d 80, 85 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1990) (holding that in view of the potential for unfair prejudice to
the defendant, the court erred in admitting evidence of a criminal defendant's
silence); State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 772 (Fla. 1998) (noting that there
was significant potential for prejudice against the accused). See generally
Maria Noelle Berger, Defining the Scope of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: Should Pre-Arrest Silence Be Admissible as Substantive Evi-
dence of Guilt?, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (1999) ("In the case of si-
lence, however, the inference of guilt is quite compelling. For many people,
no innocent man would stand silent in the face of his accusers.").
237. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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"adopted in response to a long history of oppression of the individual
by the state and today remains an important shield, protecting indi-
viduals against abuses of state authority.,
238
As many commentators have acknowledged, "[t]he Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle
of vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of
Rights. ' 239  That is, despite-or perhaps in part because of-
hundreds of books, articles, and cases discussing the origin and
breadth of the Fifth Amendment, significant disagreement still per-
sists concerning the scope and application of the right. This Article
is not an attempt to solve the quagmire concerning the meaning of
the right against self-incrimination. Rather, the issue here is, given
the basic accepted precepts that do exist, when, if at all, silence
should be admissible as evidence.
240
To attempt to answer this question, two subsidiary issues need to
be considered. First, when does the guarantee against self-
incrimination apply? Assuming it applies pretrial, the second ques-
tion becomes: Does the Fifth Amendment prevent the use of pretrial
silence?
238. Mary Shein, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege:
Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 503, 503 (1993).
239. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Princi-
ples: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 857 (1995); see
Marvin Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment Right to Si-
lence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 197 (1979) ("Despite the facial clarity of this
language, the amendment and its legal ancestors have always been shrouded in
controversy."); see also Mark Berger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191, 194 (1978) ("[The] policy
functions of the privilege have never been fully delineated or explained .... ).
240. For excellent discussions about the history of the Fifth Amendment, see
LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION (Ivan R. Dee ed., 1999) (1968); R.H. Helmholz, Origins
of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination: The Role of the European Ius
Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1990); John H. Langbein, The Historical
Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Ori-
gins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 1086 (1994).
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1. When does the Fifth Amendment apply?
There is no doubt that the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant who chooses to remain silent at trial or at sentencing.24 1
But does the Fifth Amendment apply pretrial? Contrary to the asser-
tion of some courts, there is compelling evidence that the right
against self-incrimination is not limited to the right of the suspect to
remain silent in the criminal trial context.242 Rather, the Supreme
Court has clarified that it applies in noncriminal, nontrial-like set-
tings. Thus, the privilege applies in administrative hearings, police
stations, and in a person's home. A right against self-incrimination
inures in any situation where a person might be forced to provide in-
criminating evidence against themselves. It therefore theoretically
applies to a suspect's decision to remain silent at trial and before,
postarrest and prearrest.
An interesting question is whether the Fifth Amendment applies
in situations where the person doing the questioning is not a govern-
ment official. For example, take the facts of Oplinger.243 There, a
suspected embezzler was being questioned by officials of his own
company. Or, what about the person who is not subject to question-
ing by the police or even a third party, but who simply stays silent?
In those cases the asserted silence is the person's failure to come
forward and provide an exculpatory explanation for a crime, i.e., that
he acted in self-defense. What if the state's argument is not only that
the person did not come forward to tell the police, he did not in fact
tell anyone about the purported defense?
241. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1965). But see
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he text and history of the Fifth Amendment give no indication that there is
a federal constitutional prohibition on the use of the defendant's silence as de-
meanor evidence.").
242. Indeed, many historians have written that Fifth Amendment rights were
most needed at the pretrial stage: "[I]t was in pretrial proceedings that the full
weight of the criminal process was enlisted behind the attempt to induce self-
incrimination." Moglen, supra note 240, at 1094-95; see also Berger, supra
note 236, at 1034. Historically, "it was common practice to recognize a right
to remain silent where adequate evidence to accuse the suspect did not exist."
Id.
243. United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998); see supra text
accompanying notes 163-174.
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Although some courts have held to the contrary, silence in these
circumstances should still be considered protected by the Fifth
Amendment. First, the Amendment applies even when it is "private
people" asking the questions. After all, it fully applies in any civil
case so long as the answer is potentially incriminating. As previ-
ously mentioned, the Supreme Court has recognized that the privi-
lege can be asserted "in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administra-
tive or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory. ... ,244
Moreover, the right against self-incrimination comes into play
whenever a person decides not to speak out of fear that the response
will incriminate him-even without any accusation. As Justice Mar-
shall recognized, "A voluntary decision to speak also does not impli-
cate the Fifth Amendment .... But to impose a duty to report one's
own crime . . . would itself be to compel self-incrimination, thus
bringing the Fifth Amendment into play."2 45 Certainly, assessing a
cost to someone who refrains from coming forward (preaccusation)
to explain what happened is equivalent to imposing a duty; both raise
significant concerns about self-incrimination.
2 46
2. Does admission of evidence of silence
violate the Fifth Amendment?
Given that the Fifth Amendment applies pretrial, the question
still remains, does admitting evidence that the defendant stayed silent
violate the Fifth Amendment? After all, the suspect is not being
forced to talk; he may still choose to stand mute. Thus, does the
Fifth Amendment bar such evidence? This Article asserts that the
answer is yes because admission of the evidence constitutes an
244. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); see Katharine
B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 235, 235 (1998) (The mod-
em privilege is a "right of any witness or defendant to refuse to answer in-
criminating questions in any proceeding.... ."). But see Amar & Lettow, su-
pra note 239, at 858-59 (suggesting that the self-incrimination clause was
historically addressed to formal testimonial compulsion in a judicial setting).
245. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 251 n.4 (1980) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
246. For a discussion of the concerns regarding compelled self-admissions
see Greenawalt, supra note 125.
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impermissible burden on the pretrial right to remain silent and does
not further the values of the Fifth Amendment.
247
In Griffin v. California248 the Supreme Court held that not only
does the accused have the right not to testify, the government may
not penalize that exercise of the right against self-incrimination by
commenting upon the failure to take the stand. During closing ar-
gument in Griffin, the prosecutor emphasized the defendant's failure
to explain the evidence: "These things he has not seen fit to take the
stand and deny or explain .... And in the whole world, if anybody
would know, this defendant would know."
249
The Supreme Court held that such a comment violated the Fifth
Amendment:
For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice' . . . which the Fifth
Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the
privilege by making its assertion costly .... What the jury
may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What
it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the
accused into evidence against him is quite another.
250
Of course, not all burdens on the exercise of a right constitute an
unconstitutional penalty. The question then becomes: When is a
burden impemissible? There does not appear to be a clear answer to
this question.251 In some respects, it may be a question of severity:
How likely is it that someone, contemplating the possible admission
of silence at trial, would feel compelled for that reason to forego the
privilege against self-incrimination? This question is inherently un-
quantifiable; nonetheless it is reasonable to believe that the prospect
247. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees "the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty... for such silence").
248. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
249. Id. at611.
250. Id. at 614.
251. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 ("[T]he Constitution does not forbid 'every
government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of dis-
couraging the exercise of constitutional rights."') (quoting Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,30 (1973)).
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of admission may indeed have a significant effect on the exercise of
Fifth Amendment rights. Because evidence of silence is so damning,
suspects may feel compelled to speak even in situations where si-
lence would otherwise be maintained.
Indeed, the burden in this case may be even more significant
than in Griffin.252 As stated in Griffin, even without prosecutorial
comment, a suspect knows that the jury is obviously aware of
whether or not he or she takes the stand. The defendant thus already
must include in his calculation whether remaining silent impacts the
jury. In the case of pretrial silence, however, the jury has no access
to that information if it is not admissible. It would not enter into the
defendant's consideration in deciding whether to exercise the right to
remain silent. Thus, in this respect, allowing in evidence of silence
is a greater burden on the right than the burden found in Griffin. 3
Additionally, or alternatively, an impermissible penalty may be
determined as part of a weighing process. For example, a burden be-
comes an unconstitutional penalty if that burden is not justified by
some state interest. 4 "Where burdening a constitutional right will
not yield a compensating benefit... there is no justification for im-
posing the burden."
255
In the case of admitting pretrial silence, there is no such com-
pensating benefit. The main benefit to permitting evidence of silence
at trial is promoting the truth-seeking function of the adversary proc-
ess. Because evidence of silence is "inherently ambiguous," how-
ever, the interests of truth are not advanced by admission of the evi-
dence. In fact, the interest of truth seeking may be subverted because
of the unreliability of the evidence. The innocent are just as likely as
252. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
253. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 SUP. CT. REv. 99, 146 n.241 (1978); see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529
U.S. 61, 65, 68 (2000) (declining to extend Griffin to the prosecutor's state-
ments about the defendant's status as the last witness in a case).
254. See Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 76-88 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting); see also,
Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest
Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 940, 975 (1975) (concluding that unless the State
can show that its interest in truthfulness would be advanced, use of silence is
impermissible).
255. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 79 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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the guilty to remain silent pretrial, yet the evidence damns all with a
broad stroke.
Finally, a penalty may be unconstitutional if it "impairs to any
appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.2 56
There are a number of commonly asserted purposes or values of the
Fifth Amendment. First, the guarantee against self-incrimination at-
tempts to preserve human dignity and privacy by ensuring that a per-
son is not the unwilling "instrument in his or her own condemna-
tion."257 Thus, it is oft said that the Fifth Amendment reflects "our
unwillingness to subject [an individual] to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt. '258 Moreover, the right against self-
incrimination also promotes individual dignity by helping to ensure
that self-incriminating statements are not elicited by inhumane treat-
ment or abuses. 259 Finally, the Fifth Amendment reserves to each
individual a private enclave-a guarantee that certain private
thoughts need not be revealed to the government.
Besides promoting human dignity, the Fifth Amendment repre-
sents an attempt to strike a proper balance in the criminal justice sys-
tem between the individual and the power of the state. By not requir-
ing the assistance of the accused, the Amendment ensures that "the
State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the
evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by
the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips." 260 Thus,
the right against self-incrimination rests in part on the notion that the
government shoulder the complete load in criminal proceedings-
256. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). The court in Jen-
kins combines the two approaches by asking "whether compelling the election
to speak impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the [Fifth
Amendment]" and the legitimacy of the government practice of impeachment.
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236, 238.
257. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 325 (1999).
258. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (noting that the right against
self-incrimination is "the essential mainstay of our adversary system").
259. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 430.
260. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961); see also Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (stating that Colunbe provides "[t]he essence
of this basic constitutional principle").
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relying on accusations proved by the government, not on inquisitions
conducted by the state.261
Finally, the Fifth Amendment seeks to promote justice by ex-
cluding unreliable evidence. For example, by guaranteeing the right
to remain silent, it may protect innocent defendants from convictions
caused by "bad" performances on the witness stand.262 By prevent-
ing evidence obtained through coercion or even torture, the amend-
ment promotes the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Professor Amar has argued that "reliability" is not simply one
value of the Fifth Amendment, it is the predominant value: The "ra-
tionale of the Self-Incrimination Clause [is] best read [as] reliability.
Compelled testimony may be partly or wholly misleading and unreli-
able; even an innocent person may say seemingly inculpatory things
under pressure and suspicion and when flustered by trained inquisi-
tors."
2 63
Allowing the government to use a suspect's silence against that
suspect in the case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes runs
counter to virtually all these asserted values of the Fifth Amendment.
First, it infringes on human dignity by subjecting a person to the
cruel trilemma of perjury (via express denial of charges), silence
(which becomes at the hands of the prosecutor an incriminating
statement), or self-accusation. Second, it distorts the proper balance
between individual and state by permitting the government to convict
based not on its own efforts, but by employing the (implied) words
of the suspect against him.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, admission of pretrial si-
lence contravenes the value of ensuring reliable evidence. As previ-
ously discussed, in virtually every circumstance silence is the an-
tithesis of reliable evidence. It is not only nonprobative of guilt, it
also is likely to be given undue weight by a jury. Thus, the admis-
sion of evidence of silence, like a confession abstracted after torture,
261. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) ("[O]urs is an accu-
satorial and not an inquisitorial system"); see also Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55
(noting our nation's preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice).
262. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 330-33 (1991).
263. Amar & Lettow, supra note 239, at 900-01.
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has a significant potential to mislead the truth-seeking process, not
enhance it.
3. A word about impeachment versus case-in-chief
Some may suggest that the above arguments have merit with re-
spect to the admission of silence in the government's case-in-chief,
but that they are not persuasive when silence is used for impeach-
ment purposes. 264 It can be argued that impeachment should be
treated differently for several reasons. First, a suspect who takes the
stand waives his Fifth Amendment rights, and therefore, evidence of
pretrial silence should not be excluded. Second, the courts have his-
torically recognized a greater role for admission of evidence for im-
peachment purposes in order to ensure that the Fifth Amendment not
be used as a "shield against contradiction of his untruths." 265 While
both arguments have some validity, neither are ultimately persuasive.
First, a suspect concededly waives his right against self-
incrimination when he takes the stand at trial. But this waiver should
not be considered so all encompassing that it includes pretrial Fifth
Amendment rights. As one scholar noted, "[t]he [F]iftth
[A]mendment contains many 'discrete rights,' among them the right
to postarrest silence and the right to silence at trial. A waiver by the
defendant of one of these discrete rights does not [typically] consti-
tute a waiver of others. 266
What about the second argument-that other evidence has been
admitted for impeachment purposes only and not in the case-in-chief,
to ensure that the suspect does not commit perjury? For example, in267
Harris v. New York, evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda
warnings but otherwise voluntarily procured, was held admissible for
purposes of impeaching the defendant's inconsistent trial testimony,
even though it was unavailable in the case-in-chief.268 More specifi-
cally, the defendant had been charged with making two sales of
264. See, e.g., Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000) (distin-
guishing between the impermissible introduction of evidence of pretrial silence
in the case-in-chief and the admission of the evidence for impeachment pur-
poses).
265. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
266. Schiller, supra note 239, at 224.
267. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
268. See id. at 226.
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heroin to undercover officers. At trial, Harris took the stand and de-
nied making one of the sales; he admitted making the other but
claimed that it was baking powder, not heroin, in the bag.269 On
cross-examination, the government impeached his testimony with a
prior inconsistent statement obtained in violation of Miranda.2
Admission of pretrial silence for impeachment purposes, how-
ever, is distinguishable from the situation in Harris. Indeed, the ar-
guments in Harris support excluding evidence of silence. First, to
the extent that the defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to stay si-
lent pretrial, and not simply a Miranda right, admission of such evi-
dence is a constitutional violation. That is analogous under Harris to
allowing into evidence a coerced confession obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment and not simply Miranda.27'
Moreover, the court in Harris was persuaded to admit the prior
statement for impeachment purposes precisely because such evi-
dence was deemed reliable and essential to the integrity of the
trial . 72 In Harris, the evidence consisted of a statement clearly con-
trary to the trial testimony. Harris told two different stories; he
plainly lied at least once.
In dealing with silence, no such clear contradiction of testimony
exists. Silence is simply not the equivalent of an inconsistent state-
ment-it is inherently ambiguous. While keeping out the statement
in Harris shields perjury and prevents the jury from considering reli-
able evidence, the same cannot be said about the introduction of evi-
dence of silence. Rather, as previously argued, allowing in pretrial
silence does not promote truth seeking, it promotes confusion and
misjudgment.
2 73
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 729 (3d Cir. 1974) (Seitz,
J., concurring) ("To say that a defendant's silence in the face of accusation can
be used to impeach his testimony would have the same effect as allowing im-
peachment use of coerced confessions.").
272. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (indicating that the trial testimony con-
trasted sharply with the pretrial statement and the statement "undoubtedly pro-
vided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility"); see also
Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 61 (noting also that the Harris court determined
"the additional deterrence gained by employment of the fruits of the violation
did not warrant the restriction on impeachment use").
273. See supra Part III.B.l.a, and accompanying footnotes. See generally,
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Finally, and ultimately however, the reason for not allowing the
introduction of silence for any purpose, impeachment or otherwise is
this: Admission of silence for impeachment purposes would too eas-
ily be (mis)used by the jury as evidence of guilt. That is, a jury
would not simply use the evidence as hurting the defendant's credi-
bility on a newly asserted alibi or defense-the jury is too easily led
to a belief that no innocent person would stay silent. As Professor
Schiller has noted, "[e]mpirical studies have cast doubt upon the
ability of the jury to distinguish between (a) the prosecution using
evidence of a person's prior silence as evidence of the untrustworthi-
ness of his exculpatory trial testimony and (b) the prosecutor using
the silence as substantive evidence of guilt., 274 Given the minimal,
if any, probative value of evidence of silence, this risk is not worth
taking.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current law on the use of pretrial silence is unduly confus-
ing and wrong. The simple truth is that admission of evidence of si-
lence, whether pre- or postarrest, whether pre- or post-Miranda, adds
little to the truth-seeking process. Silence is inherently, insolubly
ambiguous. Yet jurors typically ascribe great weight to such evi-
dence. The result: introduction of evidence of silence violates the
Fourteenth Amendment-it is fundamentally unfair and distorts the
trial process.
Additionally, introduction of pretrial silence violates the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. Silence is not sus-
pect: it is a right. Yet the current practice of admitting evidence of
silence burdens that right. It penalizes individuals who choose not to
assist the state in gathering evidence against them. Because such
evidence invariably is used by the jury to assess guilt or innocence, it
increases the likelihood that the "prosecution will secure a guilty
Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir. 1973) (following the ra-
tionale that silence does not bring a defendant's credibility into question).
274. Schiller, supra note 239, at 225; accord Comment, Impeaching a De-
fendant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
940, 972-73 (1975) (indicating that silence usually goes to an alibi or defense
and therefore impeachment on an issue easily gets confused with guilt or inno-
cence); Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 57.
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verdict without, in fact, having proven the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.,
275
Accordingly, this Article urges a single, simple rule: pretrial si-
lence should not be admissible in the case-in-chief or for impeach-
ment purposes.
275. Schiller, supra note 239, at 225.
